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Proxy Discrimination in the Age of 
Artificial Intelligence and Big Data 
Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz* 
ABSTRACT: Big data and Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) are revolutionizing 
the ways in which firms, governments, and employers classify individuals. 
Surprisingly, however, one of the most important threats to anti-
discrimination regimes posed by this revolution is largely unexplored or 
misunderstood in the extant literature. This is the risk that modern algorithms 
will result in “proxy discrimination.” Proxy discrimination is a particularly 
pernicious subset of disparate impact. Like all forms of disparate impact, it 
involves a facially neutral practice that disproportionately harms members of 
a protected class. But a practice producing a disparate impact only amounts 
to proxy discrimination when the usefulness to the discriminator of the facially 
neutral practice derives, at least in part, from the very fact that it produces a 
disparate impact. Historically, this occurred when a firm intentionally sought 
to discriminate against members of a protected class by relying on a proxy for 
class membership, such as zip code. However, proxy discrimination need not 
be intentional when membership in a protected class is predictive of a 
discriminator’s facially neutral goal, making discrimination “rational.” In 
these cases, firms may unwittingly proxy discriminate, knowing only that a 
facially neutral practice produces desirable outcomes. This Article argues that 
AI and big data are game changers when it comes to this risk of 
unintentional, but “rational,” proxy discrimination. AIs armed with big data 
are inherently structured to engage in proxy discrimination whenever they are 
deprived of information about membership in a legally suspect class whose 
predictive power cannot be measured more directly by non-suspect data 
available to the AI. Simply denying AIs access to the most intuitive proxies for 
such predictive but suspect characteristics does little to thwart this process; 
instead it simply causes AIs to locate less intuitive proxies. For these reasons, 
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as AIs become even smarter and big data becomes even bigger, proxy 
discrimination will represent an increasingly fundamental challenge to anti-
discrimination regimes that seek to limit discrimination based on potentially 
predictive traits. Numerous anti-discrimination regimes do just that, limiting 
discrimination based on factors like preexisting conditions, genetics, 
disability, sex, and even race. This Article offers a menu of potential strategies 
for combatting this risk of proxy discrimination by AIs, including prohibiting 
the use of non-approved types of discrimination, mandating the collection and 
disclosure of data about impacted individuals’ membership in legally 
protected classes, and requiring firms to employ statistical models that isolate 
only the predictive power of non-suspect variables.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Big data and Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) are revolutionizing the ways in 
which firms, governments, and employers classify individuals.1 Insurers, for 
instance, increasingly set premiums based on complex algorithms that process 
massive amounts of data to predict future claims.2 Prospective employers 
deploy AI and big data to decide which applicants to interview or hire.3 And 
various actors within the criminal justice system—ranging from police 
departments to judges—now use predictive analytics to guide their decision-
making.4 
 
 1. We use the term “artificial intelligence” to encompass a broad array of computational 
techniques for predicting future outcomes based on analysis of past data. These techniques 
include “machine learning,” “deep learning,” “learning algorithms,” and many other terms. 
While there are often important differences among these various types of AIs, these distinctions 
are not pertinent to the analysis in this Article. 
 2. See Rick Swedloff, Risk Classification’s Big Data (R)evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 339,  
340–44 (2014); Herb Weisbaum, Data Mining Is Now Used to Set Insurance Rates; Critics Cry Foul, 
CNBC (Apr. 16, 2014, 11:29 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/16/data-mining-is-now-
used-to-set-insurance-rates-critics-cry-fowl.html [https://perma.cc/MQ28-C8RA]; see also Ray 
Lehmann, Why ‘Big Data’ Will Force Insurance Companies to Think Hard About Race, INS. J. (Mar. 27, 
2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/right-street/2018/03/27/484530.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/4GBZ-MBZZ] (“According to a 2015 survey conducted by Willis Towers Watson, 42 
percent of executives from the property and casualty insurance industry said they were already 
using big data in pricing, underwriting and risk selection, and 77 percent said they expected to 
do so within two years.”). 
 3. See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857,  
860 (2017) (“Employers are increasingly relying on data analytic tools to make personnel  
decisions . . . .”).  
 4. See Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1068–76 
(2019); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
35, 42–55 (2014); Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff, Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Slobogin, The 
Accuracy, Equity, and Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk Assessment 1 (Dec. 26, 2018) 
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This big data revolution raises numerous complex challenges for  
anti-discrimination regimes.5 Perhaps most obviously, improperly-designed 
algorithms or errant data can disproportionately harm discrete subsets of the 
population.6 But even correctly programmed algorithms armed with accurate 
data can reinforce past discriminatory patterns.7 Surprisingly, however, one 
of the most important threats to anti-discrimination regimes posed by big data 
and AI is largely unexplored or misunderstood in the extant legal literature. 
This is the risk that modern AIs will result in “proxy discrimination.” 
Proxy discrimination is a particularly pernicious subset of disparate 
impact. Like all forms of disparate impact, it involves a facially neutral practice 
that disproportionately harms members of a protected class.8 But a practice 
producing a disparate impact only amounts to proxy discrimination when a 
 
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3306723 [https://perma.cc/ 
4DFC-2K6U]. Of course, these examples hardly exhaust the scope and import of AI and Big Data. 
For instance, these forces are fundamentally reshaping the consumer credit economy. See 
Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 3, 11–15 (2018); Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. 
REV. 781, 802–04 (2018). They are also fundamentally changing the business of financial advice, 
offering personalized AI assistants that promise to improve consumer decision-making. See Rory 
Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 862–63, 878–79 (2019).  
 5. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016) (discussing how algorithms used in society can 
perpetuate discrimination, in part through perpetuation of disadvantage); Solon Barocas & 
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 682 (2016)[hereinafter 
Barocas & Selbst, Big Data] (discussing how data is often imperfect and therefore algorithms 
inherit the prejudice of the original decision makers); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data 
and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 99–101 
(2014) (discussing ways that predictive analytic tools can perpetuate discriminatory practices). 
 6. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2014) (describing how human beings programming 
automated systems can lead to inaccurate results because the source code, predictive algorithms 
and datasets may contain human biases that have a disparate impact on certain groups). 
 7. See Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 524–28 
(2018) (arguing that “facially neutral” algorithms producing unequal outcomes should be 
challenged as violating Title VII’s stereotype theory of liability). 
 8. None of this is to suggest that mere disparate impact alone is not a significant issue 
raised by big data and algorithms. See, e.g., Robert Bartlett, Adair Morse, Richard Stanton & Nancy 
Wallace, Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 25943, 2019) (finding that disparate impact extracts as much rents as face-
to-face discrimination). But the issue of whether disparate impact alone should be actionable is 
distinct from the issue of proxy discrimination. For arguments about the desirability of disparate 
impact in insurance, see generally Matthew Jordan Cochran, Fairness in Disparity: Challenging the 
Application of Disparate Impact Theory in Fair Housing Claims Against Insurers, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. 
L.J. 159 (2011) (discussing the use of disparate impact theory under Title VII and potential 
applicability to Fair Housing Act claims against insurers); Dana L. Kaersvang, Note, The Fair 
Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993 (2006) 
(providing additional analysis on the application of the Fair Housing Act’s disparate impact 
standard to insurance); and Ronen Avraham, A Normative Theory for Insurance 
Antidiscrimination Law (Jan. 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Author) (offering a 
framework for evaluating the costs and benefits of insurance discrimination laws). 
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second condition is met. In particular, proxy discrimination requires that the 
usefulness to the discriminator of a facially neutral practice derives, at least in 
part, from the very fact that it produces a disparate impact.9 This condition 
can be met either when the discriminator intends to disparately impact a 
protected group or when a legally-prohibited characteristic is predictive of the 
discriminator’s goals in ways that cannot be captured more directly by non-
suspect data.  
This distinction between generalized disparate impact and the more 
specific phenomenon of proxy discrimination is well illustrated by positing a 
life insurer that uses an AI to price its policies. Suppose that the model 
generated by the insurer’s AI charges more for coverage to applicants who are 
members of a Facebook group focused on increasing the availability to 
African Americans’ of genetic testing for BRCA variants, which are highly 
predictive of certain cancers.10 In these circumstances, the insurer would 
almost certainly be proxy discriminating for genetic information. First, the 
AI’s pricing model would presumably disparately impact those with a genetic 
predisposition to breast and ovarian cancer, as members of the Facebook 
group are relatively likely to have a family connection to these BRCA-related 
cancers. Second, this link between membership in the Facebook group  
and genetic history would hardly be fortuitous. To the contrary, it would 
presumably be the very reason why the AI latched on to membership in the 
Facebook group when setting applicants’ premiums.11 Framing the point in 
 
 9. See generally James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 
CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 164 (2017) (presenting a hypothetical as a teaching tool to showcase 
disparate impact and proxies); Darcy Steeg Morris, Daniel Schwarcz & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Do 
Credit-Based Insurance Scores Proxy for Income in Predicting Auto Claim Risk?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 397, 418–21 (2017) (showing that one insurer’s use of credit-based insurance scores does 
not have a disparate impact based on income and therefore does not operate as a proxy for 
income); see generally also Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, Implementing Anti-Discrimination Policies 
in Statistical Profiling Models, 3 AM. ECON. J. 206, 209 (2011) (discussing how the FTC examined 
credit score use in auto-insurance pricing as a proxy for race). 
 10. In fact, according to a complaint recently lodged with the FTC, a vulnerability in 
Facebook private groups means that information about who is in what private group could be 
scraped by an algorithm. For the text of the report and Facebook’s reply, see Facebook Patient FTC 
Complaints: Released 2/18/19, MISSING FACEBOOK PATIENT CONSENT, https://missingconsent.org/ 
facebook-patient-ftc-complaints [https://perma.cc/EC85-PMLS]. 
 11. State law is inconsistent regarding the rules that govern the use of genetic information 
by life insurers, disability insurers, and long-term care insurers. By contrast, the federal Genetic 
Information and Non-Discrimination Act (“GINA”) prohibits health insurers and employers from 
discriminating on the basis of such genetic information. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 
29, and 42 U.S.C.); see Robert Klitzman, Paul S. Appelbaum & Wendy Chung, Should Life Insurers 
Have Access to Genetic Test Results?, 312 JAMA 1855, 1855–56 (2014) (arguing that modest life 
insurance coverage should be available without underwriting based on genetic information). The 
rise in genetic testing has created many legal questions. See generally Susan M. Wolf & Jeffrey P. 
Kahn, Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability Insurance: Ethics, Law & Policy, 35 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 6 (2007) (describing the role and problems of using genetic testing in disability 
insurance); Leslie E. Wolf, Erin Fuse Brown, Ryan Kerr, Genevieve Razick, Gregory Tanner, Brett 
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econometric terms, data on applicants’ membership in the Facebook group 
would likely cease to be predictive of claims in a model that controlled for 
applicants’ genetic predispositions to cancer.12  
By contrast, the insurer in this example would likely not be proxy 
discriminating with respect to policyholder race, even if African Americans 
were disproportionately harmed by the insurer’s actions. To be sure, it is 
plausible to assume that the insurer’s actions disparately impacted African 
Americans given the race-specific nature of the Facebook group. Even so, the 
predictive power of applicants’ membership in the group would probably 
have nothing to do with the correlation between such membership and 
applicants’ race. Instead, the disparate impact felt by African Americans 
would be merely fortuitous. Once again framing this point in econometric 
terms, applicants’ membership in the Facebook group would be equally 
predictive of future insurance claims even in a model that controlled for 
applicants’ race, assuming that any differences in life expectancy between 
African-Americans and other applicants can be explained by variables like 
income or access to healthcare.  
Historically, proxy discrimination was generally understood as a type of 
intentional discrimination, rather than as a subset of disparate impact. 
Indeed, the paradigmatic example of proxy discrimination by humans 
involves financial firms that refused to serve predominantly African American 
geographic regions, a phenomenon known as redlining. This practice 
constituted intentional proxy discrimination because the disparate impact it 
produced was by design: The usefulness to firms of refusing to serve redlined 
geographic regions was that it allowed them to covertly achieve their 
discriminatory aims.  
However, proxy discrimination need not be intentional when 
membership in a protected class is predictive of a discriminator’s legitimate 
goal, making discrimination “rational.”13 In these cases, firms may unwittingly 
proxy discriminate, knowing only that a facially-neutral practice produces 
desirable outcomes. The insurance example above is once again illustrative. 
The insurer in this example presumably programmed its AI simply to 
minimize future claims. It might be unaware that the AI was targeting 
applicants’ membership in a Facebook group to achieve this objective. And 
even if the insurer was so aware, it likely would not know that Facebook groups 
were predictive of genetic risk because they indirectly captured genetic 
 
Duvall, Sakinah Jones, Jack Brackney & Tatiana Posada, The Web of Legal Protections for Participants 
in Genomic Research, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (2019) (examining the various state and federal legal 
protections provided to participants in genomic research, including in life, long-term care, and 
disability insurance). 
 12. See generally Pope & Sydnor, supra note 9 (discussing how proxy effects could be 
eliminated utilizing statistical methods). 
 13. Mark A. Rothstein & Mary R. Anderlik, What Is Genetic Discrimination, and When and How 
Can It Be Prevented?, 3 GENETICS MED. 354, 354–55 (2001). 
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information.14 Either way, the insurer would be engaging in unintentional 
proxy discrimination, at least assuming—as we do throughout this Article 
—that an AI cannot intentionally discriminate independently of any human.15 
Unintentional proxy discrimination by human actors is uncommon and 
can typically be prevented by scrutinizing use of obvious potential proxies for 
membership in a protected group, like zip code.16 But unintentional proxy 
discrimination by AIs is virtually inevitable whenever the law seeks to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of traits containing predictive information that 
cannot be captured more directly within the model by non-suspect data; a 
type of information we label as “directly predictive.”17 The inherent tendency 
of AIs to engage in proxy discrimination when they are deprived of directly 
predictive traits follows inextricably from their structure.18 Predictive AIs are 
programmed to locate correlations between input data and target variables of 
interest. But unlike traditional statistical models, AIs do not accomplish this 
by relying on a human’s starting intuition about causal explanations for 
 
 14. For a useful breakdown of the different types of opacity implicated by machine learning 
algorithms, see Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1089–99 (2018) [hereinafter Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal]. In Selbst 
and Barocas’s terms, there are several reasons for the insurer’s ignorance. First, the algorithm 
requires specialized knowledge to understand. Id. In some cases, the insurer’s employees may not 
have sufficient expertise to comprehend how or why the algorithm is producing prices for 
different customers.  
  Second, the model that the algorithm produces may be so complex and sophisticated 
that it is “inscrutable” even for those within the company that possess the necessary expertise. Id. 
In other words, the sheer complexity of the algorithm may prevent those within the insurer from 
understanding how the model operates. As applied here, the model’s complexity may prevent 
the insurer from seeing the link between visits to the specified website and the higher rates 
produced by the AI’s model.  
  Finally, even if the insurer understands how the model operates, it may not understand 
why it operates the way it does. This is a scenario that Selbst and Barocas label as the “nonintuitive” 
nature of algorithms. Id. at 1091. As applied here, the insurer may indeed know that its AI 
suggests higher prices for those who visit the website at issue, but not realize that the explanation 
for this fact derives from the website’s capacity to proxy for genetic information. See generally Matt 
Turek, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY, 
www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/2DS4-ZMNB] 
(discussing the interpretability of algorithms); Making Computers Explain Themselves, MIT COMPUT. 
SCI. & ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LAB (Oct. 27, 2016), www.csail.mit.edu/making_computers_ 
explain_themselves [https://perma.cc/C97B-PGUR] (explaining the importance of 
understanding algorithm decision-making). 
 15. As a doctrinal matter, this seems likely. See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 
699 (discussing how discriminatory data mining is analogous to unintentional disparate impact 
analysis); Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 404 (2018). But see Bornstein, 
supra note 7, at 535 (arguing that algorithmic discrimination at large could fall under the anti-
stereotyping concept within Title VII’s disparate treatment). 
 16. For a discussion of this point in the insurance context, see Daniel Schwarcz, Ending 
Public Utility Style Rate Regulation in Insurance, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 941, 978 (2018).  
 17. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 18. See Kim, supra note 3, at 898–99. 
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statistical linkages between input data and the target variable.19 Instead, AIs 
use training data to discover on their own what characteristics can be used to 
predict the target variable.20 Although this process completely ignores 
causation, it results in AIs inevitably “seeking out” proxies for directly 
predictive characteristics when data on these characteristics is not made 
available to the AI due to legal prohibitions.21 Simply denying AIs access to 
the most intuitive proxies for directly predictive variables does little to thwart 
this process; instead it simply causes AIs to produce models that rely on less 
intuitive proxies. 
Thus, this Article’s central argument is that as AIs become even smarter 
and big data becomes even bigger, proxy discrimination will represent an 
increasingly fundamental challenge to anti-discrimination regimes22 that  
seek to prohibit discrimination based on directly predictive traits.23 Such 
prohibitions on the use of directly predictive characteristics are particularly 
important in insurance regulation.24 For instance, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) prohibits insurers from discriminating on the 
basis of health status25 and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination  
Act (“GINA”) prohibits discrimination by covered health insurers (and 
employers, who often provide health insurance) on the basis of genetic 
information.26 However, legally-suspect characteristics are directly predictive 
of seemingly neutral goals outside of the insurance setting as well. Thus, 
employers are prohibited from considering sex, race, age, and disability in 
 
 19. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2002) 
(explaining the traditional method of empirical research). 
 20. See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 677–78; Kim, supra note 3, at 878–80; 
Machine learning algorithms generate their own models to predict future outcomes based on 
analysis of training data. See Brent Daniel Mittelstadt, Patrick Allo, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Sandra 
Wachter & Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–
Dec. 2016, at 3. For more on how machine-learning algorithms operate, see infra Section II.B. 
 21. See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 691–92. 
 22. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363,  
365–67 (2008) (discussing “rational racism”).  
 23. Directly predictive data is predictive of a target variable (i.e., minimized future predicted 
claims) with training data that is both correctly “labelled” and “collected.” See Barocas & Selbst, 
Big Data, supra note 5, at 677–78.  
 24. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. 
REV. 403, 407–08 (1985)[hereinafter Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness] (describing the adverse 
consequences of insurance competition, pricing and risk classification). 
 25. Individual and Group Market Reforms, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-2 (2012); see JESSICA 
L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH-STATUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 
112–13 (2018). 
 26. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C); see Anya E.R. Prince, 
Insurance Risk Classification in an Era of Genomics: Is a Rational Discrimination Policy Rational?, 96 NEB. 
L. REV. 624, 626 (2018); see also Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the 
Future of Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 716 (2019) (explaining the basics of the GINA law). 
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hiring decisions, even though these factors can be directly predictive of 
neutral objectives, like maximizing employee hours worked or total sales.27 
Proxy discrimination by AIs is most likely to occur when prohibited traits 
are directly predictive of legitimate outcomes in ways that cannot be more 
directly captured by alternative data. For that reason, proxy discrimination by 
AIs may, at first blush, seem normatively acceptable. It is not. This is because 
laws that seek to prohibit discrimination on the basis of directly predictive 
traits—the only types of laws that inevitably tend to produce proxy 
discrimination by AIs—are motivated principally by the goal of preventing 
specific outcomes for members of protected groups. Unlike many other types 
of anti-discrimination laws, the questions of how or why bad outcomes obtain 
for these groups are generally secondary; that is precisely why these laws 
prohibit discrimination even when it is rational, rather than only when it is a 
byproduct of animus or irrelevant stereotypes. Proxy discrimination by AIs 
strikes at the heart of this outcome-oriented goal. To illustrate, such 
discrimination could result in individuals who get troubling genetic test 
results finding it harder to secure employment or in women who report being 
victimized by domestic abuse finding it more difficult to purchase life 
insurance. These results are normatively troubling irrespective of how or why 
they come to fruition. 
Despite the substantial risks associated with proxy discrimination by AIs, 
most of the extant legal literature and public policy analysis on AI fails to 
clearly distinguish between proxy discrimination and ordinary disparate 
impact analysis.28 Instead, most analyses conflate scenarios in which an 
 
 27. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (holding that a law school’s race-
conscious admissions policy violated challengers’ equal protection rights).  
 28. The clearest exception is the excellent piece Incomprehensible Discrimination by 
Grimmelmann & Westreich. Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 9. This unique piece is styled 
as a vignette and mock judicial opinion, focusing on analyzing a specific fictional case (an 
employment-based AI employed in the fictional universe of the movie Zootopia) under a specific 
legal regime (Title VII). It ultimately resolves this fictional case by making the same distinction 
between proxy discrimination and disparate impact we focus on in this Article. See id. at 170 (“The 
problem is that there is no explanation in the record as to which of these two correlations, if 
either, is causal. It may be that the factors directly measure applicant characteristics that 
determine success in the challenging and dangerous field of police work, and that those 
characteristics happen to be unequally distributed in our diverse society. It may also be that these 
factors are instead measuring applicants’ species and that they measure likely job performance 
only because they are identifying species in an applicant pool where the relevant characteristics are 
unequally distributed.”). For this reason, the piece does not attempt to systematically explore the 
unique dangers of proxy discrimination by AIs or how those dangers might play out and be 
addressed across different anti-discrimination regimes. At least one other article briefly refers to 
the possibility that an AI might engage in proxy discrimination, without systematically analyzing 
this possibility. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 406–07 (“That is, suppose that, to avoid this 
problem, Arti is programmed not to use protected traits in its operations. While it would then be 
race- and gender-blind, faithfulness to its mission would seem to require it to look to ‘neutral’ 
criteria but ones with a high correlation to the now-off-limits prohibited characteristics.”). Several 
prior works clearly explain the distinction between disparate impact and proxy discrimination by 
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algorithm latches on to a variable that fortuitously happens to be correlated 
with membership in a suspect class, and scenarios in which an algorithm uses 
a variable whose predictive power derives from its correlation with 
membership in the suspect class.29 This Article clarifies that only the  
latter is proxy discrimination, suggests that this phenomenon is particularly 
pernicious, and argues that the continued evolution of AI and big data will 
cause proxy discrimination to increase substantially whenever anti-
discrimination law seeks to prohibit the use of characteristics that are directly 
predictive of risk. 
For these reasons, anti-discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination 
based on directly predictive characteristics must adapt to combat proxy 
discrimination in the age of AI and big data. This Article offers a menu of 
potential strategies for achieving this objective. For instance, impacted anti-
discrimination regimes could allow, and perhaps even require, that firms 
using predictive AIs collect data about individuals’ potential membership in 
legally protected classes. In some cases, this data should be shared with 
regulators and/or disclosed to the public in summary form.30 Such data is 
necessary for firms, regulators, litigants, and others to test whether any 
particular AI is, in fact, engaging in proxy discrimination.31 Alternatively, anti-
discrimination regimes could develop specific criteria for requiring firms that 
 
algorithm, though they do not consider it in the context of AI and do not focus substantial 
attention on the distinction. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. See generally, e.g., Pope & 
Sydnor, supra note 9 (describing the circumstances in which proxy discrimination occurs); Steeg 
Morris, Schwarcz & Teitelbaum, supra note 9, at 420 (describing disparate impact).  
 29. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 691 (“Cases of decision making that 
do not artificially introduce discriminatory effects into the data mining process may nevertheless 
result in systematically less favorable determinations for members of protected classes. This is 
possible when the criteria that are genuinely relevant in making rational and well-informed 
decisions also happen to serve as reliable proxies for class membership. In other words, the very 
same criteria that correctly sort individuals according to their predicted likelihood of excelling 
at a job—as formalized in some fashion—may also sort individuals according to class 
membership.”); Kim, supra note 3, at 877 (“Data models may also discriminate when neutral 
factors act as ‘proxies’ for sensitive characteristics like race or sex. Those neutral factors may be 
highly correlated with membership in a protected class, and also correlate with outcomes of 
interest. In such a situation, those neutral factors may produce results that systematically 
disadvantage protected groups, even though the model’s creators have no discriminatory intent, 
and the sensitive characteristics have been removed from the data.”). See also generally Talia B. 
Gillis & Jann L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459 (2019) (explaining that 
restricting data models use of sensitive characteristics simply leads to the models using neutral 
factors to discriminate); Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, SOC. RES. (forthcoming) 
(analyzing whether discrimination by algorithms produces disparate treatment or disparate 
impact without identifying unique issues associated with proxy discrimination). 
 30. See Prohibit Auto Insurance Discrimination Act, H.R. 5502, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) 
(prohibiting auto insurers from taking education, occupation, employment, homeownership, credit 
score, and various other information into consideration when determining insurance rates or 
eligibility). 
 31. See Kim, supra note 3, at 898, 916–18 (discussing data classification bias and the use of 
proxies). 
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are at substantial risk of engaging in proxy discrimination to deploy “ethical 
algorithms” that explicitly seek to eliminate the capacity of any facially-neutral 
considerations to proxy for prohibited characteristics.32 Yet a third option for 
combatting proxy discrimination would be to flip the default approach to anti-
discrimination law, such that all forms of discrimination are prohibited except 
those that are specifically allowed.33 Approved forms of discrimination could 
then be set by statute or regulation based on evidence regarding the risk of 
proxy discrimination. 
In advancing these arguments, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II 
begins by tracing the evolution of proxy discrimination from a form of 
shrouded intentional discrimination by human actors to its modern and 
future incarnation in AIs. It explains why proxy discrimination by AIs is 
inevitable when the law seeks to prohibit discrimination based on directly 
predictive traits, and when anti-discrimination rules meet this initial 
condition. Having laid these foundations in Part II, Part III identifies the anti-
discrimination regimes that are most at risk of proxy discrimination  
by AIs because they target characteristics that are directly predictive of 
discriminators’ otherwise valid objectives. Part III also explains why proxy 
discrimination by AIs in these settings is so normatively troubling. Finally, Part 
IV highlights how current law is inadequate to address proxy discrimination 
by AIs and explores potential responses to this risk, drawing from several 
nascent efforts to shield existing anti-discrimination regimes from the unique 
risks associated with the growth of AI.  
II. PROXY DISCRIMINATION BY HUMANS AND AIS 
Proxy discrimination occurs when a facially-neutral trait is utilized as a 
stand-in—or proxy—for a prohibited trait. Historically, firms engaged in 
proxy discrimination in an intentional effort to thwart anti-discrimination 
laws. However, proxy discrimination need not be intentional when the law 
prohibits “rational” or “statistical” discrimination, where discrimination can 
be justified by genuine statistical differences in relevant expected outcomes 
among members of different groups. When this initial condition is met, firms 
may unintentionally discriminate on the basis of facially-neutral proxies for 
protected traits simply because doing so “works” to help the firm achieve 
legitimate objectives. Section II.A of this Part explains these points in more 
detail. 
 
 32. See Pope & Sydnor, supra note 9, at 207–09. For practical proposals to implement ethical 
algorithms in insurance, see Birny Birnbaum, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Econ. Justice, Presentation at 
CAS Ratemaking Seminar: Insurance Regulation: The Challenge of Big Data in Insurance (March 
20, 2018) (on file with Author). 
 33. See, e.g., Harvey Rosenfield, Auto Insurance: Crisis and Reform, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 69, 129 
(1998) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use of any criterion without such 
approval shall constitute unfair discrimination.”).  
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Section II.B then explores how the emergence of decision-making by AIs 
will dramatically alter the character of proxy discrimination when the law 
seeks to prohibit a specific type of rational discrimination. In particular, 
whenever the law seeks to prohibit discrimination based on traits whose 
predictive power cannot be measured more directly by facially-neutral data 
that is available to the AI (“directly predictive” data), then AIs will inevitably 
engage in increasingly effective proxy discrimination.  
Finally, Section II.C explores in more detail when illicit traits will be 
directly predictive of legitimate outcomes, thus creating the likelihood of 
proxy discrimination by AIs. This risk is greatest when a legally-prohibited trait 
is causally linked to a desired outcome, as is the case with genetic information 
and preexisting conditions. But it is also substantial when a suspect trait is 
directly linked to desired outcomes for reasons that are opaque, such that the 
trait’s predictive power is not mediated through presently quantifiable or 
available information. By contrast, the risk of proxy discrimination by AIs is 
lowest when legally suspect traits are only “indirectly predictive” of legitimate 
outcomes, meaning that they proxy for another quantifiable and potentially 
available variable, like college graduation. By decreasing the cost of acquiring 
and processing individualized data that most directly matters to outcomes, AIs 
can actually limit the risk of the latter, indirect “rational stereotyping.”34  
A. PROXY DISCRIMINATION BY HUMAN ACTORS 
Proxy discrimination is not a new phenomenon.35 Historically, the term 
referred to deliberate attempts to indirectly discriminate against protected 
groups. This type of intentional proxy discrimination occurs whenever an 
actor discriminates based on a facially-neutral characteristic that is correlated 
with membership in a legally protected group and that discrimination is 
motivated by the discriminator’s knowledge of this correlation.36 The tighter 
this correlation, the more effectively the discriminator can achieve its ultimate 
goal of weeding out members of the targeted protected group. Meanwhile, 
because the discriminator never explicitly considers membership in a 
protected group as part of its decision-making process, it can claim that it is 
complying with applicable anti-discrimination rules. 
The classic example of intentional proxy discrimination is redlining by 
financial institutions.37 During the mid-Twentieth Century, various state and 
 
 34. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 35. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Kevin Cole, Discrimination by Proxy, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 
453, 453 (1997) (analyzing the use of proxies under the anti-discrimination, disparate impact, 
and intent principles of constitutional law); Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The 
Familiar and the Forgotten, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 317–18 (1998). 
 36. See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 691–92, 694.  
 37. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH 
GAP 105–06 (2017). See generally Gregory D. Squires, Racial Profiling, Insurance Style: Insurance 
Redlining and the Uneven Development of Metropolitan Areas, 25 J. URB. AFF. 391 (2003) (examining 
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federal laws were passed prohibiting financial institutions like banks and 
insurers from discriminating on the basis of race.38 Rather than continue to 
explicitly consider race in their underwriting and pricing decisions, many 
financial institutions resorted to proxy discrimination by refusing to serve 
geographic areas that were predominantly African American.39 Although 
financial institutions publicly claimed that such redlining was motivated by 
concerns having nothing to do with race, in many cases quite the opposite was 
true: These firms specifically sought to limit their African American customers 
by discriminating on the basis of an obvious proxy for race.40 
Intentional proxy discrimination clearly violates most anti-discrimination 
laws because it constitutes disparate treatment. Disparate treatment occurs 
 
the role of racial profiling in the property insurance industry and its contribution to racial 
segregation). The historical link between proxy discrimination and discriminatory intent is also 
nicely illustrated by the Supreme Court case Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins. Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). The issue in Biggins was whether an employee who had been fired 
because his pension was close to vesting could successfully advance a disparate treatment claim 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). See id. at 608; Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 621–634 (2012)). In concluding that he could not, the Court emphasized that years of service 
(a non-suspect classifier under the ADEA) was analytically distinct from age (a prohibited 
characteristic under ADEA), notwithstanding the fact that the two were obviously correlated with 
one another. Biggins, 507 U.S. at 612. At the same time, the court clarified that the case would 
be different if there were evidence that the “employer . . . target[ed] employees with a particular 
pension status on the assumption that these employees are likely to be older.” Id. In that event, 
“[p]ension status may be a proxy for age . . . in the sense that the employer may suppose a 
correlation between the two factors and act accordingly.” Id. at 613. 
 38. See MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 60 (2d ed. 2016) (reviewing laws prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of race in credit). See generally Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, 
Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (2014) (reviewing 
prohibitions against insurers’ consideration of race in insurance). 
 39. See, e.g., Squires, supra note 37, at 396–97. 
 40. For instance, insurance textbooks from the 1950s warned underwriters of the 
importance of determining applicants’ race and ethnicity in assessing their riskiness. Brian J. 
Glenn, Post-Modernism: The Basis of Insurance, 6 RISK MGM’T & INS. REV. 131, 134 (2003). As one 
commentator explained in the late 1970s:  
Although the core concern of the underwriter is the human characteristics of the 
risk, cheap screening indicators are adopted as surrogates for solid information 
about the attitudes and values of the prospective insured. . . . Even generalized 
underwriting texts include occupational, ethnic, racial, geographic, and 
cultural characterizations certain to give offense if publicly stated. 
Robert Works, Whatever’s FAIR—Adequacy, Equity, and the Underwriting Prerogative in Property 
Insurance Markets, 56 NEB. L. REV. 445, 471 (1977) (citation omitted); see also Regina Austin, The 
Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 537–38 (1983) (describing insurers’ 
reliance on occupational and cultural stereotypes without any empirical support for these 
stereotypes). Studies show that such redlining did not, in fact, accurately reflect the riskiness of 
the affected areas. See generally Robert W. Klein, Availability and Affordability Problems in Urban 
Homeowners Insurance Markets, in INSURANCE REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE 
EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1997) (examining the lack 
of statistical support underlying the use of redlining). 
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when a discriminator intentionally treats an individual less favorably than 
others because of a protected trait.41 Although such disparate treatment is 
most closely associated with employment anti-discrimination laws, it 
constitutes a paradigmatic violation of virtually all anti-discrimination regimes 
—including the laws governing employment, insurance, housing, and 
banking. When a firm intentionally discriminates on the basis of a 
characteristic because it is a proxy for a protected characteristic, it 
undoubtedly targets members of a protected group for less favorable 
treatment and violates these laws.  
Despite the historical link between proxy discrimination and 
discriminatory intent, proxy discrimination need not be intentional. Instead, 
humans can unwittingly proxy discriminate when the law prohibits “rational 
discrimination” that can be justified based on statistical differences among 
protected and unprotected groups.42 In these circumstances, a person or firm 
may find that discrimination based on a facially-neutral characteristic is 
predictive of its legitimate objectives, even though the characteristic’s 
predictive power derives from its correlation with a legally-prohibited 
characteristic.43 This would constitute proxy discrimination, because it would 
(1) disparately impact members of a protected group, and (2) prove useful to 
the firm for precisely this reason. Yet the unwitting discriminator may be 
unaware of these realities, realizing only that discrimination based on a 
facially neutral practice “works” to predict a legitimate goal, like minimizing 
future insurance claims. 
 
 41. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (holding that disparate treatment 
occurs when “an employer has ‘treated [a] particular person less favorably than others because 
of” a protected trait.” (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988))).  
 42. There is a vast legal and economic literature on rational discrimination. For some strong 
illustrative examples, see, e.g., David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and 
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for “High-Level” Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 57, 64–66, 78–85 (1998). See generally, e.g., Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, 
Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination: A Field Experiment, 133 Q.J. ECON. 191 (2018) (arguing 
that “Ban the Box” policies which restrict employers from asking about applicants’ criminal 
backgrounds encourage racial discrimination); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of  
Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972) (discussing the statistical theory of racial 
discrimination which lead misinformed employers to discriminate against minorities in an effort 
to maximize profits); Rothstein & Anderlik, supra note 13, at 354–55 (discussing the origins and 
definitions surrounding genetic discrimination). 
 43. Statistical proxy discrimination phenomenon has received extended treatment in at 
least two economics articles, in part because it can be easily framed in econometric terms. See 
Pope & Sydnor, supra note 9; Steeg Morris, Schwarcz  & Teitelbaum, supra note 9, at 420. As Pope 
& Sydnor explain: “Econometrically the problem here is simply classic omitted variable bias. If a 
variable (e.g., zip code) in the model is correlated with a predictive characteristic that is left out 
of the model (e.g., race), the included variable will partially proxy for the omitted characteristic 
and the estimated impact of the included variable will be biased.” Pope & Sydnor, supra note 9, 
at 207. 
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To illustrate, consider how insurers’ use of credit information to price 
coverage could amount to unintentional proxy discrimination.44 Auto and 
homeowners insurers routinely set premiums using credit information, which 
is predictive of future claims. Critics often allege that this practice amounts to 
proxy discrimination for race and income.45 This criticism is facially plausible 
(if not empirically supported) for two reasons.46 First, insurers’ use of credit 
information almost certainly disparately impacts low-income and minority 
policyholders, who disproportionately have relatively low credit scores. 
Second, the reason why credit information predicts future insurance claims 
could plausibly stem from its capacity to proxy for policyholder income or 
race, even though insurer discrimination on these bases is generally 
prohibited. Policyholder income, in particular, might be predictive of future 
insurance claims if low-income policyholders are more likely to file claims 
even when losses are only moderately above their deductible. 
Notwithstanding the possibility that insurers’ use of credit information to 
price coverage might amount to proxy discrimination, insurers are almost 
certainly not intentionally proxy discriminating against low income or minority 
policyholders. From insurers’ perspectives, incorporating credit information 
into their statistical models helps predict the legitimate metric of future 
insurance claims. Some insurers might not even know there is a correlation 
between the proxy variable (credit scores) and the suspect variable (race and 
income). And even if insurers are aware of this correlation, they may not 
believe that this correlation helps to explain the power of credit information 
to predict claims. Instead, they may believe, as much available evidence in fact 
indicates, that credit information is predictive of claims because it measures 
policyholder care levels.47  
As this example suggests, the distinction between intentional and 
unintentional proxy discrimination ultimately turns on why a disparate 
impact produced by a facially neutral practice proves useful to the 
discriminator. A firm engaging in intentional proxy discrimination finds the 
 
 44. For an overview of state rules regarding discrimination based on income in  
insurance, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS ON  
CONSUMERS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 17–20 (2007), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/reports/credit-based-insurance-scores-impacts-consumers-automobile-
insurance-report-congress-federal-trade/p044804facta_report_credit-based_insurance_scores.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RXR4-G58T] [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
 45. See Press Release, Representative Rashida Tlaib, Congresswomen Take Steps to Prevent 
Automotive Insurance Discrimination with the PAID Act (July 12, 2019), available at 
https://tlaib.house.gov/media/press-releases/congresswomen-take-steps-prevent-automotive-
insurance-discrimination-paid-act [https://perma.cc/6AFU-EAWM]. 
 46. See Steeg Morris, Schwarcz & Teitelbaum, supra note 9, at 403 (describing how insurance 
scores could plausibly act as a proxy for race and income); FTC REPORT, supra note 44, at 61. 
 47. See Steeg Morris, Schwarcz & Teitelbaum, supra note 9, at 403 (“[M]any have offered 
explanations, most often arguing that people with poor credit scores are less careful or 
responsible in general”); FTC REPORT, supra note 44, at 31. 
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disparate impact produced by its facially neutral practice useful for the simple 
reason that it helps the firm to stealthily achieve its discriminatory aim.48 By 
contrast, the disparate impact produced by unintentional proxy 
discrimination is useful because it helps a firm achieve a legitimate objective, 
like predicting future insurance claims. 
Unlike intentional proxy discrimination, unintentional proxy 
discrimination is typically analyzed under a disparate impact framework 
because the lack of discriminatory intent undermines a disparate treatment 
claim. However, the availability of a disparate impact theory varies 
substantially by anti-discrimination regime; while such liability is recognized 
in the federal regimes governing employment and housing, for instance, it is 
not generally available under state insurance laws.49 Where it is available, 
disparate impact does not require any showing of discriminatory intent, even 
though such intent may in fact be present.50 Instead, it requires simply that a 
facially-neutral practice disproportionately impacts members of a protected 
group.51 If so, then the burden shifts to the discriminator to demonstrate that 
its practice has a legitimate non-discriminatory purpose that is rooted in 
business necessity. Even if the firm or actor can meet this burden, it may still 
be in violation of the law if it could achieve its legitimate aims with a less 
discriminatory alternative. 
Figure 1, below, visually lays out the relationship among intentional 
proxy discrimination, unintentional proxy discrimination, disparate impact, 
and disparate treatment. For present purposes, the key points to recognize 
are that (i) proxy discrimination can be either intentional or unintentional, 
and (ii) unintentional proxy discrimination represents one specific type of 
disparate impact claim. 
  
 
 48. See supra Section II.A. 
 49. See Steeg Morris, Schwarcz & Teitelbaum, supra note 9, at 402–03. Outside of the narrow 
context of insurance that is linked to housing, disparate impact theories are generally not 
cognizable in insurance law. And even within the housing setting, the availability of a disparate 
impact cause of action under the Fair Housing Act is unclear, turning on complex issues of 
“reverse-preemption” under the McCarran Ferguson Act. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL 
SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 151–57 (6th ed. 2015).  
 50. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that a primary purpose of disparate impact 
is to target intentional discrimination that is too difficult to prove. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, 
Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1297–98 
(1987) (describing the difficulties and “ambiguities surrounding the theory of disparate impact,” 
which have “obscured the differences between disparate impact and disparate treatment” and led 
to confusion). 
 51. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–31 (1971) (holding that “practices, 
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be 
maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, as 
recognized in U.S. v. State of North Carolina, 914 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.N.C. 1996).  
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Figure 1 
B. PROXY DISCRIMINATION BY AIS 
Big data and AI are game changers when it comes to the risk of 
unintentional proxy discrimination. In particular, proxy discrimination by AIs 
is virtually inevitable whenever the law seeks to prohibit use of characteristics 
whose predictive power cannot be measured more directly by facially neutral 
data (“directly predictive characteristics”).  
Appreciating this point requires a rudimentary understanding of how AIs 
generate predictions using big data. Such machine learning “automates the 
process of discovering useful patterns” between characteristics and desired 
outcomes.52 To do so, a computer program (the AI) is first “trained” on a 
dataset for which the outcome of interest, known as the target variable, is 
known.53 For instance, the AI might be trained on data for preexisting 
policyholders, which includes both (i) data on past and existing customers 
(input data), and (ii) the outcome of interest for these policyholders, such as 
ultimate claims payouts (target variable).   
The scale of such training data has increased dramatically in recent years.  
Traditionally, firms differentiated among customers, employees, and others 
based on a limited amount of data that they directly collected. In recent years, 
however, firms have increasingly come to rely on data secured from a broad 
number of external sources. These data frequently involve online actions, 
such as “transactions, email, video, images, clickstream, logs, search queries, 
 
 52. Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 677 (examining the concerns that arise from 
using data mining to remove human biases from the decision making process). See generally Gillis 
& Spiess, supra note 29 (analyzing current legal requirements with the structure of AI to identify 
the issues between old law and new methods). 
 53. Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 677–78. 
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health records, and social networking interactions . . . .”54 But firms rely on 
data that increasingly also extends to actions in the physical world, which are 
measured by “sensors deployed in infrastructure such as communications 
networks, electric grids, global positioning satellites, roads and bridges, as well 
as in homes, clothing, and mobile phones.”55 
From this training data, the AI derives complex statistical models linking 
the input data with which it has been provided to predictions about the target 
variable.56 In doing so, the AI entirely ignores potential explanations for these 
relationships, which are immaterial to its programmed goal of maximizing or 
minimizing the desired outcome, such as aggregate predicted claims 
expenses.57 And unlike traditional statistical models, the AI does not start 
from any overarching theory or hypothesis regarding what types of 
characteristics may prove useful for predicting the target variable.58 Instead, 
the AI effectively uses brute force to “learn” which attributes or activities 
predict the outcome of interest.59 For this reason, the ultimate statistical 
models that AIs derive are often nearly impossible to explain intuitively; the 
models work, but no one—including the programmer, the firm that relies on 
it, or the AI itself—can explain why or how it does so.60 
As a computer program, of course, AIs do not have any conscious 
awareness or objectives that are independent from those that are embedded 
within their code. For this reason, most commentators and courts believe that 
an AI cannot itself engage in intentional discrimination, at least apart from its 
programmer or user.61 Although some have suggested that algorithmic 
decision-making could, and should, be conceptualized as intentional 
discrimination, adjudication of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.62 
 
 54. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 240 (2013). 
 55. Id.  
 56. See O’NEIL, supra note 5. 
 57. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 99; see also Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A 
Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 405 (2017); Rick Swedloff, The New Regulatory 
Imperative for Insurance, 61 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6). 
 58. COMM. ON TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PREPARING FOR THE  
FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 8 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf; 
Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick & Jintong Tang, The Law and Policy 
of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961, 969–71 (2017); Allan G. King & Marko J. Mrkonich, 
“Big Data” and the Risk of Employment Discrimination, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 555, 555 (2016).  
 59. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (2019) (“The algorithm itself tries many possible combinations of variables, figuring 
out how to put them together to optimize the objective function.”). 
 60. See Bruckner, supra note 4, at 44–46; Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 59. There is a 
substantial computer science movement that is working on developing AIs that can explain their 
outputs. See, e.g., Turek, supra note 14; Making Computers Explain Themselves, supra note 14. 
 61. See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 699. 
 62. See Bornstein, supra note 7, at 571. 
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Consistent with the prevailing view, we assume that all forms discrimination 
by AI cannot be intentional unless some person intentionally embeds within 
the AI an illicit discriminatory objective or methodology, or at the very least is 
aware that the AI is acting in a discriminatory fashion and continues to employ 
the algorithm. 
Armed with this basic understanding of AI and big data, it is now possible 
to understand why these forces will inevitably produce unintentional proxy 
discrimination when the law seeks to prohibit discrimination based on directly 
predictive characteristics.63 This conclusion follows inevitably from the nature 
of predictive AIs, which are directly programmed to find linkages between 
input data and target variables, irrespective of the nature of these linkages. By 
using the data it is trained on to proxy for directly predictive but legally 
suspect information, AIs optimize their programmed objective. Moreover, as 
they are provided with more and more training data, they will become better 
and better at identifying proxies for directly predictive, but legally prohibited, 
characteristics.64 
This unintentional proxy discrimination by AIs cannot be avoided merely 
by depriving the AI of information on individuals’ membership in legally 
suspect classes or obvious proxies for such group membership.65 To be sure, 
this traditional approach to anti-discrimination law may prevent intentional 
proxy discrimination by human actors. However, it fails in the context of 
unintentional proxy discrimination by AIs, because AIs can and will use 
training data to derive less intuitive proxies for directly predictive 
characteristics when they are deprived of direct data on these characteristics 
due to legal prohibitions.66  
These conclusions are consistent with the emerging consensus in the 
extant literature that simply depriving AIs of direct data on protected 
characteristics does not necessarily prevent those algorithms from exhibiting 
bias.67 But the point here is more specific to proxy discrimination; depriving 
 
 63. See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 712 (illustrating that at least one other 
commentator has briefly suggested parallels between redlining and statistical proxy 
discrimination by AIs); see also Sullivan, supra note 15, at 416 (“In still pursuing good employees, 
[perhaps] the most likely scenario is that Arti will use proxies for the forbidden traits (second-
best criteria) to achieve results that approximate what it would have done had not sex been ruled 
out-of-bounds. If a human were to undertake this exercise, we might well talk of ‘masking’ her 
true motive, but we’ve seen that Arti has no motive[s].” (footnotes omitted)). 
 64. See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 695 (An AI armed “with a large number 
of variables will determine the extent to which membership in a protected class is relevant to the 
sought-after trait whether or not that information is an input.”). 
 65. For further discussion of this point, see infra Section IV.A.  
 66. See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 691–92. 
 67. See, e.g., Gillis & Spiess, supra note 29, at 464 (“However, the exclusion of the forbidden 
input alone may be insufficient when there are other characteristics that are correlated with the 
forbidden input—an issue that is exacerbated in the context of big data.”); Jon Kleinberg, Jens 
Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Ashesh Rambachan, Algorithmic Fairness, 108 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 
22, 22 (2018) (“Numerous studies (many of them in computer science) have pointed out that this 
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algorithms of directly predictive but suspect characteristics does not merely 
leave open the possibility of algorithms exhibiting various biases. Instead, this 
strategy will inevitably fail to prevent proxy discrimination based on suspect 
characteristics that are directly predictive of the target variable. This is 
because increasingly sophisticated AIs will affirmatively “seek out” proxies for 
prohibited, but predictive, characteristics within increasingly vast amounts of 
training data. To illustrate, an AI deprived of information about a person’s 
genetic test results or obvious proxies for this information (like family history) 
will use other information—ranging from TV viewing habits to spending 
habits to geolocational data—to proxy for the directly predictive information 
contained within the genetic test results.  
AI and big data, in sum, are poised to take the problem of unintentional 
proxy discrimination from a niche and under-theorized issue into a pervasive 
concern for all antidiscrimination regimes that seek to limit the use of 
protected traits that are directly predictive. But understanding the scale and 
urgency of this shift requires disentangling several different scenarios when 
legally suspect characteristics may be directly predictive of legitimate 
outcomes. We now turn to this task.  
C. UNDERSTANDING WHEN PROXY DISCRIMINATION BY AIS IS LIKELY TO OCCUR 
1. Direct and Indirect Proxy Discrimination 
In an ideal setting, employers, insurers, lenders, and other social actors 
would isolate the underlying causes of their desired outcomes and 
differentiate solely on these bases. Do aggressive driving patterns—as 
recorded by telematic equipment or other GPS enabled devices—cause more 
auto insurance claims? If so, then insurers could simply reduce expected 
insurance claims by choosing to insure those with less aggressive driving 
patterns. Of course, the causes of future states of the world are rarely fully 
known or understood, a reality that AI and machine learning do little to alter. 
Instead, these technologies focus solely on identifying correlations between 
known variables, on the one hand, and desired future states of the world, on 
the other.68  
 
requires more than just excluding race from the predictor, since protected features such as race 
could be reconstructed from other features.”).  
 68. Some may argue that actors do not actually care about causation. For example, the 
argument goes, why would an insurer care whether a bad credit score causes a life insurance claim or 
not—as long as they can lower the riskiness of their insurance pool, who cares what is causative and 
what is correlative? Practically, this is true since determining causation is rarely a possibility. However, 
relying on correlation will naturally leave error in the risk pool. There will be some with poor credit 
scores who will live a long life. In the arms race of underwriting, the first insurer to determine how to 
best split those with poor credit scores into those with low credit who are at risk of early death versus 
those with low credit who are not will have the upper hand against other insurers. If these insurers 
knew true causation, they would have an accurate assessment of the riskiness in their pool. This could 
also break insurance, but that is neither here nor there for this Article. 
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However, the risk that AIs will in fact proxy discriminate depends 
substantially on the different pathways of causation and correlation that link 
a legally protected characteristic and a target variable of interest. To the 
extent that there is no such link—as is undoubtedly the case in many 
scenarios—then proxy discrimination by AI is not possible, even if disparate 
impact may be. By contrast, as described above, AIs will inevitably tend to 
proxy discriminate whenever the law prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
a directly predictive characteristic, meaning that the characteristic’s power to 
predict a desired “target variable” cannot be captured more directly by facially 
neutral data. There are two different ways in which this condition can be met, 
which we label casual and opaque proxy discrimination. Proxy discrimination 
is also possible when a protected characteristic has predictive power solely 
because it correlates with a known, facially-neutral characteristic. As explained 
below, we label this indirect proxy discrimination.   
 
Causal Proxy Discrimination (Direct) 
 
Variable (X) Proxies for (Y) Which causally predicts 
(Z) 
Facially neutral classifier Suspect classifier Desired outcome 
 
First, a legally-suspect characteristic can be directly predictive because it 
is causally linked to the desired outcome, as depicted above.69 For present 
purposes, a suspect classifier is causally predictive of some future state of the 
world when its presence would always impact the probability of the targeted 
outcome in a statistical model, irrespective of any additional information that 
could be added to that model.70 In other words, causation requires a direct 
link between a suspect classifier and a desired outcome such that the 
predictive power of the suspect classifier is not itself a result of it proxying for 
some omitted or unknown characteristic. The desired outcome can 
encompass a variety of measures, from end-goal characteristics, such as 
likelihood of filing claims or defaulting on a loan, to market-based outcomes, 
such as price elasticity or likelihood to stay in one place of employment for 
multiple years. 
Perhaps the best example of such a causally predictive characteristic is 
the gene for Huntington’s disease, which is essentially 100 percent penetrant 
—individuals with a series of nucleotide repeats in the HTT gene over a set 
threshold are essentially always going to develop the disease, whereas those 
 
 69. Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 859, 
866 (2016). 
 70. See generally JUDEA PEARL & DANA MACKENZIE, THE BOOK OF WHY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF 
CAUSE AND EFFECT (2018) (developing a general theory of causation that focuses on counter-
factual questions regarding what would occur in various hypothetical scenarios). 
A6_PRINCE_SCHWARCZ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2020  1:15 PM 
1278 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:1257 
below a certain threshold will never develop the disease.71 There are no other 
variables, such as environmental causes or other genes, that help to predict 
whether Huntington’s disease will develop.72 Direct causal relationships like 
these are hard to isolate. But when they exist, sufficiently sophisticated AIs 
deprived of direct information about these characteristics due to legal 
restrictions will identify and use any available data that even partially proxies 
for this information. For instance, in the case of Huntington’s disease, if 
algorithms were legally prohibited from taking into account genetic tests for 
the disease (Y), they could proxy for the disease through variables (X) like 
family medical history or visits to a website for a Huntington’s disease support 
group.73 
Opaque Proxy Discrimination (Direct) 
 











A second scenario in which a legally suspect characteristic can be directly 
predictive—thus tending to produce proxy discrimination by AIs—is when it 
is correlated to a desired outcome, but its predictive character is not mediated 
through a presently quantifiable or available variable. We label this opaque 
proxy discrimination.  
Opaque proxy discrimination can occur in two scenarios. First, it may be 
that the causative variable for which the suspect classifier is proxying cannot 
be quantified because it is not fully understood. If so, then it may be that the 
suspect variable is in fact causative or that it is merely proxying for a causative 
factor. For example, in the genetics context, even for many pathogenic 
genetic variants, it is often unknown why a particular sequence in a gene leads 
to increased risk.74 It may well be that one gene has been identified as higher 
risk because it is correlated with some other more particular DNA segment 
that has yet to be identified and characterized. Alternatively, it may be that 
the true causative mechanism is epigenetic changes that turn on and off the 
gene in question. 
 
 71. Huntington Disease, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/ 
huntington-disease#genes [https://perma.cc/NWB3-QEPH] (last reviewed June 2013). 
 72. Id. 
 73. For Huntington’s disease, there is a 50 percent chance of inheriting the genetic marker, 
and thus developing the disease, if a parent had Huntington’s. Id. If a grandparent had 
Huntington’s, but it is not known whether the parent did, the chance of developing the disease 
is 25 percent. Id. 
 74. See Brendan Bulik-Sullivan et al., An Atlas of Genetic Correlations Across Human Diseases and 
Traits, 47 NATURE GENETICS 1236, 1236 (2015). 
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The other scenario in which opaque discrimination can occur is when 
the suspect variable proxies for a true causative variable that is understood, 
but nonetheless difficult to quantify. A good example involves sex and auto 
insurance. Sex (Y) is predictive of auto insurance claims (Z) in part because 
young girls tend to drive more safely than young boys.75 Of course, it is 
possible to obtain more direct information about care levels (A). But such 
data is not widely available, as driver “care” is difficult to quantify. For this 
reason, simply banning the use of sex-based discrimination will predictably 
lead to proxy discrimination by AIs because sex is directly predictive of care 
levels in ways that are not mediated through any alternative, presently 
quantifiable, variables. 
Proxy discrimination by AIs is just as likely to occur when the link between 
the suspect variable and target variable is opaque as compared to when it is 
causal. In both cases, the suspect variable is “directly predictive.” But unlike 
in the case of causal proxy discrimination, AIs engaging in opaque proxy 
discrimination may cease to proxy discriminate in the future if new facially 
neutral data becomes available that more directly proxies for the true 
causative variable than the suspect variable. Returning to the example of sex 
and auto insurance, insurers are increasingly generating more direct data 
about driver care levels through techniques like telematics. As this data 
becomes more widely available, AIs may shift from proxy discriminating based 
on sex to discriminating based on non-suspect and more direct measures of 
driver care, like frequency of sudden stops.  
 
Indirect Proxy Discrimination 
 









In both causal and opaque proxy discrimination, prohibited 
characteristics are “directly predictive” of legitimate outcomes of interest. But 
proxy discrimination may also occur due to indirect connections between 
prohibited traits and target variables. In particular, proxy discrimination will 
tend to occur when a suspect variable is predictive of a desired outcome only 
because it proxies for another, quantifiable and potentially available, variable 
 
 75. See Rating Automobile Insurance: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations 
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. 4–5 (2019) (statement of James Lynch, Chief Actuary 
and Senior Vice President of Research and Education, Insurance Information Institute),  
available at https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba09-wstate-lynchj-
20190501.pdf [https://perma.cc/YET5-AFRZ].  
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that causes the desired outcome but that is not included in the AI’s training 
data.76 This type of indirect proxy discrimination is visually depicted above. In 
these cases, the predictive power of the original facially neutral classifier is 
attributable to its correlation with the suspect classifier, whose predictive 
power is, in turn, attributable to its correlation with the causative facially 
neutral characteristic. The suspect variable does not itself constitute “directly 
predictive” data in these cases; instead, it is predictive merely because it 
provides one of several potential ways to assess the likelihood of some true 
causative factor that is both quantifiable and potentially available, but not in 
fact accessible to the AI.  
This is akin to omitted variable bias in statistics. For instance, height  
(A) might be directly predictive of job performance for job (Z), but the AI 
might lack access to data on the current applicants’ heights. In this case, the 
algorithm may find that applicants’ sex (Y) is an imperfect proxy for height 
(A), since height and sex are highly correlated. Deprived of information on 
sex due to laws prohibiting discrimination on this basis, the algorithm might 
use a proxy for sex, such as applicants’ Netflix viewing habits (X), to predict 
the outcome of interest (Z). In that sense, indirect proxy discrimination is the 
AI parallel to “statistical discrimination”; the AI would be acting just as an 
employer who refuses to interview people with traditionally female first names 
because there is a legitimate job-specific reason for hiring tall employees and 
height is not specified on job applicants’ resumes.77 
Unlike both causal and opaque proxy discrimination—where the suspect 
variable is directly predictive—indirect proxy discrimination is simply a 
possible, but hardly inevitable, result of algorithms. Indirect proxy 
discrimination will not occur if either data on the causative facially neutral 
characteristic (A) is included in the model directly, or if better proxies than 
the suspect characteristic are available to the AI.78 Returning to the example 
of sex discrimination and height, an AI will not engage in indirect proxy 
discrimination if it can directly access data on height (a non-suspect variable) 
or can proxy for height more effectively by exclusively relying on factors that 
are not linked to sex, like recent clothing purchases.  
For these reasons, indirect proxy discrimination may well tend to 
decrease as more data is added into training data and AIs become more 
sophisticated. However, if new data becomes available but is not incorporated 
into a particular AI, preexisting proxy discrimination will continue. 
 
 76. Barocas and Selbst describe this as “rational racism.” Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra 
note 5, at 690. “Accordingly, the persistence of distasteful forms of discrimination may be the 
result of a lack of information, rather than a continued taste for discrimination.” Id. 
 77. See Agan & Starr, supra note 42, at 193–94. 
 78. See W. Nicholson Price II, Note, Patenting Race: The Problems of Ethnic Genetic Testing 
Patents, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 119, 134–37 (2007) (discussing why race is a poor proxy 
in genetic tests since those tests directly evaluate the underlying trait relevant to the outcome). 
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Analytically, such proxy discrimination would shift from opaque proxy 
discrimination to indirect proxy discrimination. 
 A summary of these three types of proxy discrimination—causal, 




2. The Difficulty of Identifying Causal, Opaque, and Indirect Proxy 
Discrimination by AIs in the Real World 
While it is helpful to parse out each of these potential types of proxy 
discrimination—causal, opaque, and indirect—in reality, the predictive value 
of the myriad available variables in a big data world is much more complex. 
For every algorithmic prediction of a desired outcome there is: usually more 
than one explanation; evidence of correlation, not causation; and voluminous 
amounts of data to explore. As such, identifying ahead of time how likely a 
particular AI is to proxy discriminate is an immensely difficult, if not 
impossible, task. 
Rarely is there just one causative explanation for a desired outcome. 
Rather, multiple variables or combinations of variables predict an outcome.79 
 
 79. Pope & Sydnor, supra note 9, at 206. See generally Bruce Glymour & Jonathan Herington, 
Measuring the Biases that Matter: The Ethical and Casual Foundations for Measures of Fairness in 
Algorithms, PROCEEDINGS OF ACM CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
269, 270 (2019) (mapping a variety of potential causal mechanisms possible in a model). 
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For this reason, different types of proxy discrimination are likely to all occur 
at the same time. Take sex and mortality. In general, women live longer than 
men—there is a correlation between sex and life expectancy.80 Thus, where 
life insurers are prohibited from directly considering sex, the algorithms they 
employ may rely on facially-neutral proxies for sex. But the predictive power 
of sex almost certainly derives substantially from its capacity to proxy for other 
omitted and measurable variables, such as utilization of healthcare, workplace 
exposures and hardships, and risky behaviors like drinking, smoking,  
and overeating.81 Additionally, there are probably some socio-cultural 
contributors to life expectancy that cannot be readily measured, such as how 
one’s role as caregiver could increase self-esteem and recognition in a way 
that leads to longer lives.82 Finally, there are some biological differences 
between the sexes that causally explain variance in life expectancy, such as 
differences in hormones.83 
Thus, all three types of proxy discrimination are at play when an AI 
proxies for sex in predicting life expectancy by, for instance, using social 
media likes or names to proxy for sex. First, the algorithm is engaging in 
causal unintentional proxy discrimination, as biological sex has a causal 
explanation for some elements of life expectancy. Second, sex is standing in 
as a proxy for other unknown or unmeasurable variables, implicating opaque 
proxy discrimination. Third, because sex is itself a proxy variable for omitted 
facially neutral variables, such as how much one smokes, the AI is engaging in 
indirect proxy discrimination. All three types of proxy discrimination exist in 
the same correlative relationship because, in reality, there is rarely one 
distinct cause of a desired outcome—most variables are not like the gene for 
Huntington’s disease. Each partially predicts the desired outcome. 
Not only are all three types of proxies likely to appear in the same model, 
they will often build on each other. For example, a suspect classifier (age) may 
proxy for a facially neutral category (years since graduation) which proxies 
for some unquantifiable data (comfort with learning new technology), which 
predicts a desired outcome. Alternatively, an AI may proxy for one suspect 
classifier, which proxies for another suspect classifier, which proxies for a 
facially neutral characteristic that is casually linked to the target variable. To 
illustrate this possibility, reconsider the height and sex example above, where 
an AI proxies for sex though a facially neutral variable (such as shopping 
 
 80. Bertrand Desjardins, Why Is Life Expectancy Longer for Women than It Is for Men?, SCI. AM. 
(Aug. 30, 2004), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-is-life-expectancy-lo [https:// 
perma.cc/ZE3B-B8AX]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Johns Hopkins-Led Study Shows Increased Life Expectancy Among Family Caregivers: Findings 
Contradict Long-standing Beliefs About Caregiver Stress, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Oct. 15, 2013), 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/johns_hopkins_led_study_shows_inc
reased_life_expectancy_among_family_caregivers [https://perma.cc/NV4U-QGUW]. 
 83. Desjardins, supra note 80. 
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patterns) because sex proxies for height, which is relevant to job 
performance. In this example, the data on shopping patterns may in fact 
proxy for gender (a suspect characteristic), which in turn proxies for sex (also 
a suspect characteristic), which ultimately proxies for the facially neutral 
characteristic of height. 
The upshot of these complexities is that while it is relatively easy in theory 
to identify when an AI is likely to engage in proxy discrimination, it is 
immensely difficult to do so in practice. Of course, this is only a problem if 
proxy discrimination by AIs is itself troubling from a broader social 
perspective. As we explore in the next Part, this is undoubtedly the case.  
III. THE HARMS OF PROXY DISCRIMINATION BY AIS  
When an AI proxy discriminates, it uses a facially neutral variable to 
capture the predictive power of a legally prohibited trait. This Part explores 
the potential implications of such proxy discrimination by AI. To do so, it first 
identifies the many different settings in which anti-discrimination laws do, in 
fact, prohibit discrimination on the basis of traits that are directly predictive 
of discriminators’ legitimate goals. In these circumstances, AIs will tend to 
capture the prohibited trait’s predictive power using facially neutral data 
proxies, as discussed above, unless the law affirmatively prevents this outcome 
from obtaining, a possibility we discuss in Part IV.  
Second, this Part explains why proxy discrimination by AIs is so troubling 
from a normative perspective. Ultimately, the argument is straight-forward: 
Laws that prohibit discrimination based on directly predictive traits are 
normatively grounded in the goal of preventing specific outcomes for 
members of protected groups. Unlike some anti-discrimination settings, the 
questions of how or why bad outcomes are experienced by protected groups 
are secondary, if relevant at all, in these domains. Because proxy 
discrimination by AIs tends to produce the very same outcomes that would 
result in the absence of legal restrictions on discrimination based on  
directly predictive traits, it represents a substantial threat to the normative 
underpinnings of these anti-discrimination regimes.  
A. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION REGIMES AT RISK OF PROXY DISCRIMINATION BY AIS 
Not infrequently, discrimination based on a legally suspect trait is 
rational because the trait contains predictive power that cannot be more 
directly captured by available facially neutral data. In other words, the data is 
“directly predictive” of the outcome of interest.84 The law nonetheless bars 
actors from taking into account these traits because doing so has broader 
normative implications.85 As suggested in Part II, proxy discrimination by AIs 
 
 84. See supra Section II.C.1. 
 85. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics 
of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003) (taking a normative approach to the assertion 
A6_PRINCE_SCHWARCZ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2020  1:15 PM 
1284 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:1257 
is a substantial, and nearly inevitable, risk in these settings, at least absent 
affirmative counteracting legal strategies like those we discuss in Part IV. 
These initial conditions where proxy discrimination by AIs is likely to flourish 
are most obvious in insurance, but also exist in other settings, such as 
employment and education.  
1. Health Insurance 
Numerous state and federal laws prohibit health insurers from 
discriminating on the basis of directly predictive characteristics. Most notably, 
the ACA86 prohibits or limits discrimination on the basis of prior health 
history, preexisting conditions, age, sex, and smoking history.87 Indeed health 
insurers are currently only able to consider up to four traits when setting 
insurance premiums.88 Many individual states also prohibit discrimination 
based on some, or all, of these individual traits.89 Each of these legally-suspect 
characteristics are, of course, directly predictive of health insurers’ expected 
claims expenses, as they predict future medical expenses for reasons that 
cannot be more directly captured by alternative, facially-neutral data. 
The ACA is by no means the only law that bars health insurers from 
discriminating on the basis of directly predictive, and potentially causal, 
information. In particular, GINA bars health insurers and employers from 
discriminating on the basis of genetic test results or several obvious proxies 
 
that the effects of accommodation requirements are similar to those of antidiscrimination 
requirements). Of course, in many cases the membership in a protected class will be “irrelevant 
to the outcome in terms of discriminatory effect, at least given a large number of input features.” 
See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 695. 
 86. See Individual and Group Market Reforms, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-2 (2012). Some 
“health insurance” plans like short duration plans or association plans are not required to comply 
with the ACA and therefore retain the ability to underwrite on a broad set of traits. Id. 
 87. Under the ACA, insurers can vary rates based on only four factors: (1) whether a plan 
covers an individual or family; (2) a “rating area” or geographic area designated by the state;  
(3) age; and (4) smoking status. Id. § 300gg(a)(1)(A). Even the use of these characteristics is 
constrained, as the law sets allowable ratios across subgroups of individuals with the characteristic. 
Id. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(iv). These restrictions on ratemaking are coupled with guaranteed 
issue and renewability provisions that require insurers to accept all applications for health 
insurance and to continue to insure existing policyholders as long as they pay premiums. Id. 
§§ 300gg-1–300gg-2. Additionally, the ACA explicitly prohibits several types of rational 
discrimination, most notably the use of gender and pre-existing conditions. See e.g., Sherry A. 
Glied & Adlan Jackson, Access to Coverage and Care for People with Preexisting Conditions: How Has It 
Changed Under the ACA?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 22, 2017), https://www.common 
wealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/jun/access-coverage-and-care-people-preexisting-
conditions-how-has [https://perma.cc/MXK4-58KX]. 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A); see infra Part IV.  
 89. Some states have further restricted allowable ratios for age and smoking—sometimes all 
the way down to 1:1, thus essentially removing the characteristic from consideration. CTR.  
FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Market  
Rating Reforms: State Specific Rating Variations, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs- 
and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/state-rating.html [https://perma.cc/8TM8-
FDBS] (last updated June 2, 2017). 
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for such information.90 Yet there is little doubt that certain types of genetic 
test results are—or will be in the future—directly predictive of legitimate 
considerations for both employers and insurers.91 For example, genetic tests 
for early onset Alzheimer’s could help employers or health insurers identify 
individuals at increased risk of needing costly healthcare interventions. As 
genetic information becomes better understood and more widely accessible, 
this possibility that genetic information may be directly predictive will only 
increase. As Part IV discusses, the ACA, but not GINA, partially limits the 
possibility of proxy discrimination. 
2. Non-Health Insurance 
Unlike health insurers, non-health insurers such as life, automobile, 
property, or disability insurers are regulated predominantly by the states. And 
under state laws prohibiting “unfair discrimination,” these insurers can 
generally discriminate on the basis of traits if, and only if, they are predictive 
of risk.92 But there are also important legal prohibitions on specific types of 
discrimination by non-health insurers, though they vary significantly by  
state and line of insurance.93 These include prohibitions on insurance 
discrimination based on: race, national origin, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
age, income, credit scores, marital status, disability, length of driving 
experience, genetic information, and many others.94 The implication of this 
structure is that specifically-prohibited traits cannot be used by insurers even 
if they are predictive of risk; otherwise trait-specific prohibitions in insurance 
would be superfluous given more general laws banning “unfair 
discrimination.”     
Perhaps the most intuitive example of this structure involves state laws 
prohibiting insurers from discriminating against individuals who have been 
victims of intimate partner violence. Historically, insurers frequently 
discriminated against this population precisely because they were genuinely 
at greater risk of death, injury, or property destruction.95 Despite the fact that 
a history of intimate partner violence is directly predictive of insurers’ 
outcome of interest (insurance claims), many states chose to ban such 
 
 90. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.  
110-233, 122 Stat. 881(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C). 
 91. There is, however, an ongoing debate about the actuarial significance of most 
information that comes from genetic tests due to the complexities of environment and biological 
mechanisms of disease. See generally Prince, supra note 26 (examining the ethical, financial, and 
legal questions presented by this debate). 
 92. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 49, at 138; Prince, supra note 26, at 640; Schwarcz, 
supra note 16, at 987.  
 93. See Avraham et al., supra note 38, at 243; Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too 
Important to Be Left to the Actuaries, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 387–92 (1986). 
 94. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 49, at 138–41. 
 95. See Ellen J. Morrison, Note, Insurance Discrimination Against Battered Women: Proposed 
Legislative Protections, 72 IND. L.J. 259, 275 (1996).  
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discrimination by statute or regulation.96 A second intuitive example involves 
state prohibitions of sex-based discrimination in auto insurance.97 Such 
discrimination is common in the absence of legal prohibitions precisely 
because sex is directly predictive of claims, as young women tend to drive 
more safely than young men and most auto insurers have limited alternative 
data that more directly predicts safe driving.98 Nonetheless, several states ban 
such discrimination.  
3. Employment  
Employment anti-discrimination law is another important example of a 
regime that prohibits discrimination based on directly predictive 
characteristics.99 As in the health insurance context, GINA is illustrative: 
Under GINA, employers are prohibited from considering genetic 
information, even though it could help predict any number of facially 
legitimate outcomes of interest to employers, such as anticipated productivity 
or longevity of tenure.  
But GINA is hardly an isolated example. The Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”),100 for example, prohibits discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities who can perform the essential functions of a job with or without 
“reasonable accommodations.”101 This is true even if the individual’s disability 
may be directly predictive of outcomes like costs spent on accommodations, 
group health insurance costs, or longevity.102 The Pregnancy Discrimination 
 
 96. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-211(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2011); see also ABRAHAM & 
SCHWARCZ, supra note 49, at 276. See generally Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance 
Fair?: A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 361 
–69 (1997). 
 97. See, e.g., Ann Carrns, In California, Gender Can No Longer Be Considered in Setting Car 
Insurance Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/your-
money/car-insurance-gender-california.html [https://perma.cc/96FF-WZFZ].  
 98. For younger drivers, women tend to have fewer claims than men. Some insurers report 
that this trend reverses for older drivers, though insurers have different experiences on this point. 
See id. 
 99. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 402–03; see also Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 
694–713 (detailing employment antidiscrimination frameworks). 
 100. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b), 104 Stat. 327, 329 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). 
 101. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a 
Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 307, 314–15 (2001) (arguing that the ADA treats “differently situated” persons 
differently in its reasonable accommodation standard, unlike other employment laws). 
 102. See generally, Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833 (2001) 
(discussing reasonable accommodations required by the ADA). See Bagenstos, supra note 85, at 
832 (“[A]ccommodation requirements represent nothing more than a specific example of the 
general prohibition of rational discrimination—a prohibition that is well entrenched in the 
law.”); see also Sharona Hoffman, Big Data’s New Discrimination Threats: Amending the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to Cover Discrimination Based on Data-Driven Predictions of Future Disease, in BIG DATA, 
HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 85, 85–87 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018) (examining how 
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Act (“PDA”)103 also prohibits discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”104 Furthermore, it requires that 
employers must provide reasonable accommodations to women who are 
temporarily disabled due to pregnancy.105 Pregnancy—or factors suggesting 
the likelihood of future pregnancy—would likely be directly predictive of 
facially neutral objectives for many employers, most obviously the likelihood 
of a prospective employee taking an extended leave of absence.106 
Yet another intuitive example of an employment law that proscribes 
directly predictive discrimination is the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (“ADEA”),107 which prohibits discrimination against individuals 
who are 40 years of age or older.108 Age is almost certainly predictive of at least 
some employers’ expected returns on prospective employees.109 Older job 
applicants generally have fewer remaining working years than younger 
applicants, which may limit the extent to which they are likely to advance 
within the organization.110 Older employees may also be more likely to take 
medical leaves than younger workers due to health complications.111 For these 
reasons, AIs may well proxy discriminate for age when producing hiring or 
advancement recommendations for a variety of employers. 
Finally, Title VII bars employers from discriminating on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex and national origin.112 Although these traits are less 
intuitively ‘directly predictive’ of outcomes of interest, they can, in fact, meet 
this condition. For example, race is correlated with a wide variety of outcomes 
 
employers may also be interested in using big data to identify those who are predicted to get a 
disability in the future; however, noting that such predictive health information is not adequately 
legally protected in anti-discrimination laws). Indeed, the reasonable accommodation features of 
the ADA led to a wide-ranging legal literature regarding the extent to which the law paralleled 
more conventional federal anti-discrimination regimes, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 642, 644, 651–52, 672–74 (2001) (describing the distinction between accommodation 
requirements and antidiscrimination laws); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, 
Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–3 (1996). 
 103. Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 104. Id. See also generally Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929 (1985) (providing an overview of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act’s mechanism for equalizing the social status of each sex).  
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 106. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1311, 1332–34 (1989) (“[T]he [PDA] compels the employer to ignore a real difference in the 
average cost of male and female employees.”). 
 107. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). 
 108. See id. § 631.  
 109. See Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 231 (1990) (“[O]lder workers may in fact 
create costs for employers in ways not encountered under Title VII.”). 
 110. See id. at 251. 
 111. See id. at 289. 
 112. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 403. 
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in American society, from education, to incarceration, to income. Although 
these correlations generally can be explained by a variety of facially neutral 
factors, these factors are not always susceptible to direct, quantitative 
measurement. For that reason, race, unfortunately, is likely to remain directly 
predictive of a wide range of facially legitimate considerations for many 
discriminators.113  
In contexts where explicit or implicit discrimination preexists, traits like 
race, ethnicity and sex may even be directly predictive because they are 
causally linked to facially neutral objectives. Consider an example: Amazon 
recently was forced to abandon an AI that it had developed to identify 
promising employees, because the AI tended to select male applicants using 
proxies for sex on applicants’ resumes.114 One likely explanation for this 
tendency of the AI was that male employees at Amazon had, in fact, been 
more productive than their female counterparts due to the company’s culture 
implicitly or explicitly favoring men. If so, then sex would be causally linked 
to the outcome of interest, notwithstanding that consideration of that trait is 
legally proscribed.  
4. Other Legal Areas 
Even outside the insurance and employment contexts, the law regularly 
seeks to prohibit actors from taking into account traits that are directly 
predictive of an outcome of interest. This is all the more likely as algorithms 
and big data are increasingly used to make decisions in domains like 
housing,115 lending,116 and policing.  
To illustrate, race remains highly predictive of criminal recidivism rates 
for a variety of difficult-to-quantify reasons.117 As such, AIs that are 
programmed to calculate recidivism rates will inevitably seek to capture the 
predictive power of race by relying on proxies for that characteristic.118 
 
 113. See BARADARAN, supra note 37 (describing “black banking” and similar initiatives as a 
decoy for avoiding broader social reforms). 
 114. See Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias Against Women, 
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2018, 10:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-
automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUS 
KCN1MK08G [perma.cc/KLL3-J3TK]. 
 115. James A. Allen, The Color of Algorithms: An Analysis and Proposed Research Agenda for 
Deterring Algorithmic Redlining, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 219, 234–35 (2019). 
 116. See Inge Graef, Algorithms and Fairness: What Role for Competition Law in Targeting Price 
Discrimination Towards End Consumers, 24 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 541, 542 (2018) (highlighting how 
European anti-discrimination laws do not adequately address algorithmic price discrimination 
concerns); King & Mrkonich, supra note 58, at 559; Odinet, supra note 4, at 804. 
 117. See Huq, supra note 4, at 1047–48; Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, 
Risk, Race, and Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 686 (2016). 
 118. See, e.g., Alexandra Chouldechova, Fair Prediction with Disparate Impact: A Study of Bias in 
Recidivism Prediction Instruments, 5 BIG DATA 153, 153 (2017) (“[W]e show that the . . . evidence 
of racial bias in [recidivism prediction models] are a direct consequence of applying an [RPI that 
satisfies predictive parity] to a population in which recidivism prevalence differs across groups.”). 
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Moreover, in many cases race is predictive of considerations that might matter 
to a discriminator for directly causative reasons that cannot be disentangled 
from race itself. For instance, a well-developed literature suggests that 
minority students often perform less well in educational settings than similarly 
situated non-minority students, in part, because of “stereotype threat,” a 
phenomenon whereby members of stereotyped groups experience self-
fulfilling anxiety/pressure about confirming perceived stereotypes.119 As 
such, an AI that a college used to predict prospective applicants’ academic 
performance would likely proxy discriminate for race in order to capture its 
predictive power. These examples could be replicated for gender, age, 
disability, and a host of other traits that social actors are commonly barred 
from taking into account. 
B. PROXY DISCRIMINATION BY AIS UNDERMINES THE INTENDED GOALS OF  
IMPACTED ANTI-DISCRIMINATION REGIMES  
Proxy discrimination by AIs is thus a significant risk across a broad 
spectrum of legal domains that prohibit discrimination based on directly 
predictive characteristics. But why, one might wonder, is this a problem? Any 
number of normative anti-discrimination theories focus on the reasons why 
members of protected groups are disadvantaged, asking questions like 
whether the discriminator was motivated by animus or other types of 
improper motivations.120 Given that proxy discrimination by AIs is 
predominantly a risk when legally suspect factors are directly predictive of the 
discriminator’s legitimate objectives, one might suggest that such 
discrimination is non-problematic under these theories.   
This objection misses the mark because normative anti-discrimination 
theories that focus on discriminators’ motives are a poor fit when it comes to 
laws that prohibit “rational discrimination.”121 In these cases, the law prohibits 
discrimination even though there is (arguably) nothing morally objectionable 
about the discriminator’s logic for disfavoring members of the protected 
 
 119. See CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI AND OTHER CLUES TO HOW STEREOTYPES 
AFFECT US 125–26 (2010) (discussing how “stereotype threat” can “increase vigilance toward 
possible threat[s] and bad consequences in the social environment, which divert[] attention and 
mental capacity away from the task at hand”). 
 120. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, 
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 175 (1992) (describing how “many otherwise 
immoral reaction preferences are preferences of individuals who are not fully morally 
responsible”). 
 121. This point is detailed at length by Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos. See Bagenstos, supra 
note 85, at 836–37 (arguing that laws prohibiting “rational discrimination” cannot be coherently 
defended based on concerns regarding the discriminator’s motivation, but must instead be 
justified based on outcome-oriented concerns such as mitigating “a pattern of social and 
economic subordination that has intolerable effects on our society”).  
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group.122 This point is particularly powerful when it comes to discrimination 
based on directly predictive characteristics.123 When a discriminator relies on 
indirectly predictive characteristics (as in ordinary statistical discrimination), 
it uses group characteristics rather than exerting the effort to directly assess 
an individual’s relevant traits. For that reason, the discriminator arguably 
engages in an unreasonable decision-making process that amounts to 
stereotyping.124 But when an illicit characteristic is directly predictive, it is 
impossible for the discriminator to more directly assess the relevant 
characteristic, meaning that such group-based logic is hard to assail.125 
Accordingly, objections to treating individuals as members of groups have 
limited force in these settings. 
For these reasons, the normative underpinnings of anti-discrimination 
regimes that prohibit discrimination based on directly predictive 
characteristics like disability, pregnancy, health, or genetics are necessarily 
predominantly outcome-oriented.126 The goal of these laws, in other words, is 
to prevent socially-harmful outcomes for members of the protected group. It 
follows that proxy discrimination by AIs is normatively troubling because it 
will tend to produce the very results that the relevant anti-discrimination laws 
are designed to prevent.   
The remainder of this Part details the various outcome-oriented reasons 
why the law might prohibit discrimination based on directly predictive traits. 
These include promoting social risk-sharing, preventing the chilling of 
socially valuable behavior, limiting the effects of past discrimination, and 
protecting non-conforming members of groups from being “actuarially 
saddled” with their group’s characteristics. Although the relevance of these 
rationales varies across anti-discrimination regimes, the core point is that each 
is outcome-oriented, meaning that proxy discrimination by AIs will directly 
undermine the law’s objectives. To illustrate, women who report experiencing 
intimate partner violence will find it harder to purchase life or property 
insurance; individuals with a pathogenic BRCA variant will face more limited 
insurance and employment prospects; individuals with disabilities will have a 
harder time securing employment; and minority students may find it harder 
 
 122. See id. Instead, the discriminator merely pursues the “ultimate end of maximizing profit 
[with] . . . no interest in harming minorities per se.” Id. at 851.  
 123. See, e.g., Mittelstadt et al., supra note 20, at 8 (“For the affected parties, data-driven 
discriminatory treatment is unlikely to be more palatable than discrimination fuelled [sic] by 
prejudices or anecdotal evidence. . . . [D]iscriminatory treatment is not ethically problematic in 
itself; rather, it is the effects of the treatment that determine its ethical acceptability.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 85, at 854–59. 
 125. See Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 564, 572–73 (1998) (proposing that discrimination laws make members of 
protected groups believe they are receiving special or equal treatment). 
 126. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375, 
1395 (2014) (arguing that the problem of blatant proxies is that they result in the very outcomes 
that original laws seek to prevent). 
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to secure admission to college. These outcomes, of course, strike at the heart 
of the underlying anti-discrimination laws to which they relate, irrespective of 
how or why they obtain. 
1. Promoting Social Risk Sharing 
A number of anti-discrimination regimes prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of directly predictive characteristics in order to socialize individual 
risks.127 This goal is epitomized in the insurance context, where 
discrimination tends to undermine social risk sharing by fragmenting 
individuals into increasingly homogenous risk-pools.128 Although such risk-
based discrimination can help prevent moral hazard and adverse selection,129 
it can also impose undue or excessive risks on underserved groups.130 
Unregulated health insurance markets, for instance, typically result in those 
with substantial preexisting conditions being unable to acquire adequate 
 
 127. An extensive literature covers the goal of using anti-discrimination laws to achieve social 
solidarity by spreading certain risks, like the risk of negative health outcomes, across broad swaths 
of society. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1593–1602 (2011); Allison K. Hoffman, Three 
Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care  
Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1883–88 (2011). A closely related goal is promoting efficient 
redistribution through prohibitions on discrimination. See John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan 
Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1235–38 (2018); Kyle 
Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX 
L. REV. 157, 249 (2003); Ramsi Woodcock, Personalized Pricing and the Return of Wealth 
Redistribution at the Market Level 11–12 (2019) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3378864. 
 128. In the early history of insurance, carriers typically pooled the risks of community 
members without attempting to discriminate among them, thus converting insured risks from 
individual burdens into communal responsibilities. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: 
Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 372–73 (2003); Deborah A. Stone, 
The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 287, 298–300 (1993); see 
also Austin, supra note 40, at 519–26. Such community insurance rating inevitably broke down in 
the face of competition, as new insurers sought to cherry-pick lower risk members of the 
community from the broader risk pool by offering them lower rates. See generally Peter Siegelman, 
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004) (arguing 
that adverse selection in insurance markets is not as great of a threat as is often predicted). This 
discrimination in favor of low-risk community members tended to become self-reinforcing; 
insurers who declined to discriminate among policyholders based on anticipated risks were left 
with increasingly high-risk policyholder, triggering increased premiums, and, ultimately, causing 
more relatively low-risk policyholders to be cherry-picked by competing insurers. 
 129. Adverse selection occurs when asymmetrical information allows high-risk individuals to 
enter an insurance pool at a premium level below their commensurate risk. Ronen Avraham, The 
Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 44 (2012). Moral hazard is when 
policyholders take less care or do not minimize loss or risk of loss due to the fact that they have 
insurance to cover losses. Id. at 66. 
 130. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 66 (1986)[hereinafter ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK]; see Prince, supra note 26, 
at 631–32. 
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coverage at affordable prices.131 Ensuring access to reasonable health 
insurance for these individuals not only protects some of the most vulnerable 
members of society, but also minimizes costs elsewhere in the system.132   
It is for precisely these reasons that federal and state laws prohibit or limit 
discrimination by health insurers on the basis of numerous directly predictive 
characteristics.133 By regulating discrimination on the basis of factors like 
preexisting conditions, age, and sex, state and federal laws seeks to achieve a 
specific outcome: the spreading of individual health risks across broad swaths 
of society so as to promote the availability of affordable health insurance.   
Health insurance is hardly the sole example of a legal regime that 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of directly predictive traits in order to 
socialize risk. For instance, the ADA can also be justified on the basis that it 
properly shifts the costs of reasonable accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities to employers and society more broadly, so as to promote 
employment among those with disabilities.134 Similarly, the goal of the PDA 
can largely be understood as partially socializing the employment-related 
costs of pregnancy, so that they are not borne entirely by women.   
Proxy discrimination by AI strikes at the heart of regimes like these that 
seek to prohibit discrimination in order to promote social responsibility for 
certain risks. The reason should be obvious: They shift the costs of directly 
predictive characteristics back on to the protected group. Individuals with 
preexisting conditions may find it harder to purchase insurance; individuals 
with disabilities may be less able to secure employment; and women of child-
bearing age may be paid less or have fewer employment opportunities. It is 
thus quite beside the point that proxy discrimination by AIs might produce 
these results without any conscious intent on the part of the discriminator or 
for reasons unrelated to animus or inaccurate stereotypes.  
2. Preventing the Chilling of Socially Valuable Behavior 
A second important reason why the law sometimes prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of directly predictive traits is to ensure that socially 
important activities are not chilled. This goal is most salient with respect to 
laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of genetic information. As 
scientists first started mapping the human genome in the 1990s, advocates 
highlighted evidence showing that individuals were so fearful of genetic 
discrimination that they were avoiding genetic testing.135 This fear, of course, 
 
 131. See Baker, supra note 128, at 377, 381.  
 132. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012) 
(requiring covered hospitals to provide emergency medical care regardless of an individual’s 
ability to pay). 
 133. See supra Section III.A.1. 
 134. See Bagenstos, supra note 85, at 839–44. 
 135. See generally Mark A. Hall, Jean E. McEwen, James C. Barton, Ann P. Walker, Edmund G. 
Howe, Jacob A. Reiss, Tara E. Power, Shellie D. Ellis, Diane C. Tucker, Barbara W. Harrison, 
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restricted the identification of important medical information that could be 
beneficial in research or clinical care.136 It also impeded the acquisition of 
information that could help individuals take effective medical interventions 
to prevent or mitigate disease, avoid risky activities, and take drugs at doses 
that are particularly likely to be effective.137 Congress passed GINA largely to 
counteract these concerns and encourage individuals to undertake genetic 
testing and participate in genetic research without fear of negative 
outcomes.138 
GINA also helps to prevent the chilling of a different type of socially 
beneficial activity: the expressive or associational actions of those who learn 
that they have genetic risk factors. Such individuals are likely to rationally fear 
that their participation in potentially observable activities will trigger 
discrimination.139 Those who have a pathogenic BRCA1 or BRCA2 variant, for 
instance, may choose to avoid looking for support communities because they 
legitimately fear that doing so may lead to future discrimination.140  
 
Gordon D. McLaren, Andrea Ruggiero & Elizabeth J. Thomson, Concerns in a Primary Care 
Population About Genetic Discrimination by Insurers, 7 GENETICS MED. 311 (2005) (finding that 
concern about genetic discrimination varies substantially by race and other demographic factors 
and by nationality) [hereinafter Hall et al., Concerns in a Primary Care Population]; Mark A. Hall & 
Stephen S. Rich, Patients’ Fear of Genetic Discrimination by Health Insurers: The Impact of Legal 
Protections, 2 GENETICS MED. 214 (2000) (finding that patients’ and clinicians’ fear of 
discrimination had not been limited by existing laws at the time of their survey); Yann Joly, Ida 
Ngueng Feze & Jacques Simard, Genetic Discrimination and Life Insurance: A Systematic Review of the 
Evidence, 11 BMC MED. 1 (2013) (finding fear of genetic discrimination prevalent in patients and 
research participants); E. Virginia Lapham, Chahira Kozma & Joan O. Weiss, Genetic 
Discrimination: Perspectives of Consumers, 274 SCI. 621 (1996) (finding a level of perceived 
discrimination in members of genetic support groups). 
 136. Areheart & Roberts, supra note 26, at 722. 
 137. See, e.g., Allen D. Roses, Pharmacogenetics and the Practice of Medicine, NATURE, June 15, 
2000, at 861 (describing the effectiveness of DNA-based screening). 
 138. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C) (noting potential 
avoidance of genetic testing as a reason for passing legislation); Areheart & Roberts, supra note 
26, at 722–24. Of course, GINA can also be justified based on other goals, such as promoting 
social responsibility for genetically-encoded conditions. See generally Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting 
Discrimination: Lessons From the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 437 
(2010) (describing some of the goals of GINA). For a broader discussion of the harms of genetic 
discrimination, see Susan M. Wolf, Beyond “Genetic Discrimination”: Toward the Broader Harm of 
Geneticism, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 345, 349–50 (1995). 
 139. See Joly et al., supra note 135, at 1–2; Hall et al., Concerns in a Primary Care Population, 
supra note 135, at 311; Laura M. Amendola, Jill O. Robinson, Ragan Hart, Sawona Biswas, Kaitlyn 
Lee, Barbara A. Bernhardt, Kelly East, Marian J. Gilmore, Tia L. Kauffman, Katie L. Lewis, Myra 
Roche, Sarah Scollon, Julia Wynn & Carrie Blout, Why Patients Decline Genomic Sequencing Studies: 
Experiences from the CSER Consortium, 27 J. GENETIC COUNSEL. ONLINE 1220, 1224 (2018). 
 140. As another example, a member of a particular political or religious group may avoid 
posting their group affiliation on social media or forego viewing a particular documentary or 
partaking in another action associated with the group out of fear of repercussions. Helveston, 
supra note 69, at 891–92. 
A6_PRINCE_SCHWARCZ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2020  1:15 PM 
1294 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:1257 
GINA is not the only example of a law that prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of directly predictive characteristics so as to avoid chilling socially 
beneficial activities. Consider, for instance, state laws prohibiting insurers 
from discriminating on the basis of intimate partner violence.141 A central 
explanation for such laws is that insurance discrimination could  
dissuade victims of violence from seeking needed medical care or police 
intervention.142   
Proxy discrimination by AIs holds the potential to undermine these goals 
by allowing discriminators to indirectly harvest the predictive power of suspect 
traits like genetic tests or domestic violence reports. Any number of data 
points might allow an AI to proxy for such information, including the websites 
an individual visits, the location and information in their cell phones, or their 
social media posts.143 Once individuals learned from experience or news 
reports, or even began to suspect, that activities like genetic testing or 
reporting domestic violence could result in future discrimination, proxy 
discrimination by AIs would tend to produce the very same results that the law 
sought to avoid: Individuals would decline to participate in socially-beneficial 
activities like genetic testing because they rationally fear the negative results 
that may follow.   
To be sure, the ultimate impact of proxy discrimination by AIs on 
behavior is hard to fully anticipate. On one hand, the black box nature of AIs 
may minimize any particular chilling effect. In most instances of intentional 
discrimination or implicit bias, members of protected groups have an 
opportunity to understand the link between their protected status and an 
adverse event. By contrast, the link between a negative outcome and the 
specific data relied on by an AI is typically completely opaque to impacted 
individuals. This is for a variety of reasons, most notably the proprietary nature 
of most AIs and the vastness of the data on which they rely.144 The upshot of 
this opacity is that many members of protected groups may not know enough 
about how or when AIs will attempt to proxy for their protected traits to adjust 
their behavior accordingly.  
On the other hand, the opacity of AI and big data could plausibly 
produce much stronger chilling effects for members of protected groups than 
a more transparent system of discrimination. Those who experience anxiety 
about “revealing” their status to an AI could well adjust their behavior even 
more than necessary to avoid such discrimination. This is particularly likely 
when individuals have an intuitive understanding that their membership in a 
protected class could indeed be highly relevant to firms’ facially neutral goals. 
 
 141. See generally Hellman, supra note 96 (examining the claims from the insurance industry 
and its critics regarding insurance for battered women). 
 142. Id. at 376–77. 
 143. See David C. Vladeck, Consumer Protection in an Era Of Big Data Analytics, 42 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 493, 497–501 (2016) (describing how data brokers collect and store information). 
 144. See supra Part II. 
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Thus, cancer survivors or individuals with genetic markers for Huntington’s 
disease may be particularly likely to refrain from activities associated with 
these facts, anticipating the mere possibility that an insurer, credit institution, 
or employer could harvest information on those activities. 
These harms are not just theoretical. Recently, life insurers have started 
predicting life expectancy by relying on proxies that derive from social 
media.145 This reality has led prominent newspapers like the Wall Street 
Journal to recommend that individuals post on social media pictures of 
themselves exercising and eating healthy, while avoiding posts of themselves 
smoking or engaging in extreme sports.146 As proxy discrimination by AI 
becomes more common, it is easy to imagine similar newspaper stories 
warning individuals not to join Facebook groups associated with suspect 
characteristics like genetic conditions or domestic violence, because doing so 
might result in future adverse consequences for insurance, credit, or 
employment.147 
3. Limiting or Reversing the Effects of Past Discrimination 
Another reason why the law may forbid discrimination based on directly 
predictive characteristics is to slow an otherwise self-replicating pattern  
of economic subordination experienced by members of historically 
disadvantaged groups.148 
Anti-subordination goals are particularly relevant with respect to 
prohibitions on the use of race, even when race is directly predictive of 
legitimate considerations, like recidivism rates or predicted academic 
 
 145. See Leslie Scism, New York Insurers Can Evaluate Your Social Media Use—If They Can Prove 
Why It’s Needed, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-
insurers-can-evaluate-your-social-media-useif-they-can-prove-why-its-needed-11548856802 [https:// 
perma.cc/A9RK-QEH3]. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Prominent politicians have also warned of the discriminatory harms of big data and AI. 
See Danny Li, AOC Is Right: Algorithms Will Always Be Biased As Long As There’s Systemic Racism in This 
Country, SLATE (Feb. 1, 2019, 3:47 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/aoc-
algorithms-racist-bias.html [https://perma.cc/MS6F-YYGM]. 
 148. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 260 (1971) 
(discussing employer’s liability in the antidiscrimination context); Sunstein, supra note 29, at 8. 
Of course, a vast literature exists exploring this antisubordination view of antidiscrimination law. 
See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. 
L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2000) (proposing an understanding of antidiscrimination law premised on 
changing social practices). See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) 
(revisiting the role antisubordination and antidiscrimination values play in the post-Brown equal 
protection framework). So too does a literature that rejects this view of antidiscrimination law, 
favoring instead an autoclassification logic that focuses on prohibiting decision-making based on 
impermissible factors. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 102, at 845–46. As suggested by the earlier 
discussion, whatever the merits of this debate in general, this type of anti-classification logic is a 
poor fit when it comes to laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of traits that are directly 
predictive of otherwise legitimate goals of the discriminator. See supra Section III.B. 
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performance. For instance, reconsider research demonstrating that members 
of certain minority groups tend to experience self-fulfilling anxiety that their 
academic performance will confirm negative prejudices.149 As discussed 
above, this phenomenon potentially causes race to be directly predictive of 
college performance.150 At the same time, negative prejudices about racial 
groups are themselves a product of historical animus and subordination. By 
forbidding discrimination based on race, even though it is in fact directly 
predictive of otherwise legitimate factors like anticipated college 
performance, the legal system attempts to limit the capacity of past 
discrimination to impact future results.  
This goal of limiting the impact of historical subordination animates 
prohibitions on directly predictive forms of discrimination in other domains 
as well. For instance, federal prohibitions on pregnancy discrimination were 
generally justified as necessary to overcome workplace structures that were 
designed by men for men.151 Similar arguments have often been made to 
justify the ADA, as many of the difficulties that individuals with disabilities face 
in traditional work environments are themselves a legacy of those with 
disabilities being excluded from traditional employment settings.152 
As above, proxy discrimination by AIs undermines this anti-
subordination goal by precluding the realization of the law’s objectives.153 
Laws that are based on anti-subordination principles are fundamentally about 
changing social and economic structures that reflect and reinforce historical 
discrimination. Proxy discrimination by AIs affirmatively thwarts this objective 
by reproducing and reinforcing these legacies of historical discrimination on 
the implicit ground that they make economic sense for discriminators. Yet the 
rationale of these laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of directly 
predictive traits is that change is often necessary, even though it can be costly 
or difficult for those who benefit most from the existing system. 
Not only can proxy discrimination by AIs thwart the anti-subordination 
goals of existing anti-discrimination laws, but it can affirmatively promote the 
opposite result. By allowing discriminators to indirectly but reliably take into 
account the ways in which historical discrimination impacts marginalized 
groups, proxy discrimination by AIs can cloak the reproduction of these 
 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 150. We do not imply, of course, that race is causally predictive of educational performance. 
However, it may be directly predictive through opaque relationships given that the impact of past 
discrimination and societal structures is difficult to quantify and measure. 
 151. See Siegel, supra note 104, at 951–52. 
 152. See Bagenstos, supra note 85, at 839. 
 153. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 29, at 8 (“Difficult problems are also presented if an 
algorithm uses a factor that is in some sense an outgrowth of discrimination. For example, a poor 
credit rating, or a troubling arrest record, might be an artifact of discrimination, by human 
beings, before the algorithm was asked to do its predictive work. There is a risk here that 
algorithms might perpetuate discrimination, and extend its reach, by using factors that are 
genuinely predictive, but that are products of unequal treatment.”). 
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historical hierarchies in seemingly neutral and objective structures. For 
instance, minority job applicants may face difficulty beating employment 
algorithms that proxy discriminate for race due to the reality that past 
minority applicants may have faced difficult adjustment periods due to factors 
like stereotype threat.154 This lack of steady employment can lead to limited 
credit availability, causing difficulties getting insurance and access to 
healthcare. And these realities, in turn, can cycle back to making college even 
less accessible to targeted members of historically-disadvantaged groups.155 
This type of feedback loop makes proxy discrimination by AIs particularly 
pernicious, since it is the inequitable outcome from one silo that makes the 
use of that outcome as a proxy rational in the next silo.   
4. Anti-Stereotyping 
Another potential goal of anti-discrimination regimes that prohibit the 
use of directly predictive characteristics is to prevent the classification of 
individuals based on their membership in certain stereotyped groups. As 
suggested above, such an anti-stereotyping principle is hard to justify based 
on the impropriety of the discriminator’s decision-making process when the 
suspect characteristic is directly predictive.156 But anti-stereotyping can be a 
coherent goal of anti-discrimination regimes that prohibit use of directly 
predictive traits to the extent that the focus is on the potential unfairness of 
the outcomes produced by such stereotyping. Even rational discrimination 
based on directly predictive traits necessarily results in individuals who do not 
conform to group averages being treated as if they do.157   
Numerous court cases highlight this tension between the rational use of 
averages in models and the desire for individualized treatment. For example, 
in City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, the Supreme 
Court reviewed a pension system where female employees paid larger 
contributions than men for the same monthly benefit due to higher life 
expectancies.158 The majority ultimately determined that this scheme violated 
 
 154. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 810 (1995) (concluding 
“that stereotype threat is an underappreciated source of classic deficits in standardized test 
performance”). 
 155. See O’NEIL, supra note 5, at 147–49. 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 121–26. An anti-stereotyping principle can also be 
justified by reducing social stigma for members of a protected group. However, given the opacity 
of AI, this stigmatization may be a less-likely harm of proxy discrimination than other concerns 
of anti-stereotyping. 
 157. See ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 130, at 74–75; see also Bornstein, supra note 
7, at 525–28 (arguing that the anti-stereotyping theory of Title VII could be used to limit some 
harms of algorithmic decision-making in employment). 
 158. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704–05, 708 (1978) 
(“The question, therefore, is whether the existence or nonexistence of ‘discrimination’ is to be 
determined by comparison of class characteristics or individual characteristics.”). 
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Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, because it assumed individuals would 
conform to broader trends associated with their sex.159 Such discrimination, 
the court suggested, is troubling from a civil rights perspective because it fails 
to treat individuals as individuals, as opposed to merely members of the 
groups to which they belong. 
Of course, the contexts in which the law tolerates the potential unfairness 
of attributing group characteristics to individuals varies across contexts and 
groups. As Manhart suggests, employers are forbidden from stereotyping 
based on a wide range of characteristics, including: age, disability, race, sex, 
and genetic information.160 These laws are driven, in part, by the fact that 
employment decisions are generally individual: A specific person is hired, 
fired, or demoted, based on his or her past or expected contribution to the 
employer’s mission. By contrast, stereotyping individuals based on group 
characteristics is generally more tolerated in domains like insurance, where 
individualized decision-making is often impractical.161   
As discussed in Part III, proxy discrimination by AIs can directly 
undermine the law’s efforts to limit the unfair outcomes of stereotyping for 
non-conforming members of the group. In some cases, AI could minimize 
stereotype harm if more predictive variables are available. However, in other 
cases, especially when the predictive power of the stereotype is opaque or 
direct, algorithms directly target members of protected groups and then 
assign them the characteristics of that group. In such cases, proxy 
discrimination by AIs “actuarially saddles” members of a protected group with 
the general characteristics of their group.162  
 
 159. Id. at 708–11. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun voiced his discomfort with this 
rationale, arguing that an individualized analysis is unrealistic because there is no way to 
accurately predict when someone will die. Id. at 724 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice 
Burger’s dissent noted that since it is impossible to make individual determinations about 
lifespan, the use of actuarial data is an attempt “to treat them as individually as it is possible to do 
in the face of the unknowable length of each individual life.” Id. at 727–28 (Burger, J., 
dissenting). 
 160. See Bornstein, supra note 7, at 525–26 (arguing that predictive AIs in the employment 
setting can be challenged under an anti-stereotyping theory of disparate treatment law); Jessica 
A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 
1225 (2011); Kim, supra note 3, at 884–85;  
 161. See generally Avraham et al., supra note 38 (arguing that while there are limits to 
stereotyping by insurance companies, stereotyping is how different risk groups are identified). 
 162. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania is illustrative 
of the potential unfairness of this approach. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm’r of 
Pa., 482 A.2d 542, 545–46 (Pa. 1984). In that case, male auto policy holders complained that 
they were charged higher premiums for the same coverage as women of the same age and driving 
records. Id. The Commissioner found that such gender-based premiums in auto insurance 
constituted “unfair discrimination,” and the court agreed, in part because there is a lack of 
causality between gender and accidents. Id. Statistical calculations do exactly this, because they 
only consider the likelihood that, on average, individuals with a specified trait will experience the 
outcome in question. See Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness, supra note 24, at 408; see also FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 3–7 (2006); Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, 
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* * * 
 
The Figure below summarizes the analysis in this Part demonstrating the 





supra note 5, at 688 (“As Professor Frederick Schauer explains, decision makers that rely on 
statistically sound but non-universal generalizations ‘are being simultaneously rational and 
unfair’ because certain individuals are ‘actuarially saddled’ by statistically sound inferences that 
are nevertheless inaccurate.”); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 120 (2010) (“[Legal feminists] needed an approach 
that would direct courts’ attention to the particular institutions and social practices that had 
perpetuated inequality in the context of sex and counteract the widespread perception that sex 
discrimination redounded to women’s benefit.”); Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” 
of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1354–58 (2012) (discussing interpretations of Title 
VII as a means of combatting gender-based discrimination in the workplace).  
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IV. RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO PROXY DISCRIMINATION  
As Parts II and III make clear, the accelerating evolution of AI and big 
data render proxy discrimination a fundamental threat to important goals of 
many, if not most, antidiscrimination regimes. As such, this Part considers a 
variety of potential options for how antidiscrimination regimes might respond 
to the emerging risk of proxy discrimination by AIs. Section IV.A begins by 
explaining why two common features of antidiscrimination regimes—a ban 
on the use of obvious proxies for suspect characteristics and disparate impact 
liability—cannot effectively prevent proxy discrimination by AI. Section IV.B 
then surveys five more promising approaches for combatting the risk of proxy 
discrimination by AIs. These strategies either impact the data that AIs can 
access or regulate when or how AIs can use this data.163  
A. INEFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS  
Many antidiscrimination regimes have features that are capable of 
policing against traditional, intentional proxy discrimination against 
protected groups, such as red lining. The two most pervasive such strategies 
are to explicitly ban the use of specific potential proxies and to subject 
discriminators to a disparate impact theory of liability. As we describe below, 
however, neither of these strategies has any plausible chance of combatting 
proxy discrimination by AIs.164 
1. Ban Discriminators’ Use of Obvious Proxies for Protected 
Characteristics 
Many antidiscrimination regimes ban actors not just from utilizing a 
protected trait, but also from considering obvious proxies for this protected 
trait. GINA exemplifies this strategy. In GINA, Congress recognized that 
simply banning insurer use of genetic test results would do little to assuage 
public fear of discrimination if employers and insurers could substitute clear 
proxies for genetic results into their decisions. For example, a law that 
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of a test result indicating 
increased risk of colon cancer does little if employers could simply extrapolate 
the likely genetic status of the individual from family history. GINA, therefore, 
not only bars the use of genetic test results, but also the use of several of the 
most obvious proxies for this information. GINA accomplishes this by broadly 
 
 163. This menu of options explores only the narrow concerns of algorithmic proxy 
discrimination. There are a host of other potential concerns with bias, skewed data, and 
discriminatory impacts of algorithms at large. Regulatory options should consider and address 
these broader concerns, but this Article focuses on solutions that may address the specific 
concerns of algorithmic proxy discrimination, some of which may help address broader concerns 
as well. See Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic 
Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
 164. Because we assume that algorithms cannot intentionally discriminate, we do not discuss 
legal prohibitions on such discrimination in this Part. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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defining “genetic information” to include a spectrum of genetic-related traits, 
such as genetic test results, family medical history, participation in genetic 
research, and use of genetic services, such as going to see a genetic 
counselor.165 
GINA not only forbids employers and health insurers from using any 
genetic information, but also limits them from collecting this information.166 
These privacy protections make GINA distinct among most antidiscrimination 
laws in the employment setting, where information about protected traits is 
readily observable to discriminators.167 By restricting the availability of 
protected information and obvious proxies for that information, GINA 
attempts to limit the capacity of employers, insurers, or other actors to 
discriminate against protected individuals.168 
State insurance law also attempts to combat proxy discrimination by 
banning insurers’ consideration of obvious proxies for prohibited 
characteristics, as well as their access to information about those 
characteristics. The exact contours of this strategy vary by state and line of 
coverage. Most states ban insurers from collecting any information about 
suspect characteristics, like race or income.169 Additionally, as with GINA, 
some states ban insurers from using specific proxies for protected 
characteristics. Prohibitions on insurer consideration of credit score 
(arguably a potential proxy for policyholder race/income) and zip code (a 
more concerning proxy for policyholder race/income) are illustrative.170 
Finally, state regulators and policymakers occasionally scrutinize known 
classification factors that could be proxies for suspect characteristics.171 For 
 
 165. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4) (2012). 
 166. Id. § 2000ff-1(b). 
 167. See generally Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an 
Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597 (2011) (evaluating GINA as an 
antidiscrimination law). 
 168. This strategy is supported empirically as a way to address issues of bias, whether direct 
or implicit. See generally, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. 
REV. 991 (2004) (showing that job applicants with African-American sounding names on resumes 
were less likely to be interviewed than those with White-sounding names, even though the resume 
qualifications were similar); Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact 
of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000) (showing that more female 
musicians were selected for orchestras when their gender was hidden from view). 
 169. See Daniel Schwarcz, Towards a Civil Rights Approach to Insurance Anti-Discrimination Law, 
69 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 11–12, 24–25)[hereinafter Schwarcz, 
Civil Rights]. 
 170. See Austin, supra note 40, at 525–26: Squires, supra note 37, at 392; Works, supra note 
40, at 472. 
 171. Thus, a regulatory handbook for insurance examiners instructs them to identify “any 
‘red flags,’ such as . . . a factor that is an obvious proxy for some prohibited characteristic” when 
reviewing insurers’ underwriting and rating practices. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MARKET 
REGULATION HANDBOOK 63 (2017), available at https://www.in.gov/idoi/files/Market%20 
Regulation%20Handbook%2017_Vol1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6SJ-Z5GV]. When such red 
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instance, insurers’ reliance on credit information became controversial only 
after it was recognized that insurers’ use of this information might operate as 
a proxy for legally-suspect characteristics, like income or race.172 
Prohibitions on discriminators’ consideration of potential proxies for 
suspect characteristics also appear outside the insurance setting. For example, 
two acts recently passed in New York173 and California seek to expand the 
definition of race to include hair texture and hairstyles because these are traits 
“historically associated with race.”174 As the findings of the legislation state, 
“[i]n a society in which hair has historically been one of many determining 
factors of a person’s race, and whether they were a second class citizen, hair 
today remains a proxy for race.”175 For this reason, the laws bar employers and 
educational institutions from discriminating against those with hairstyles 
common to African-Americans, such as braids, locks, and twists.  
Although these strategies may effectively prevent traditional intentional 
proxy discrimination,176 they have little power to prevent proxy discrimination 
 
flags exist, regulators are supposed to ask whether “the underwriting guideline serve[s] a 
necessary underwriting purpose by identifying a characteristic of the consumer, vehicle or 
property that is demonstrably related to risk of loss and does not duplicate some other factor that 
has already been taken into account.” Id. 
 172. BIRNY BIRNBAUM, CTR. FOR ECON. JUSTICE, INSURANCE CREDIT SCORING: AN  
UNFAIR PRACTICE 6 (2005), available at http://www.cej-online.org/cej%20report%20ins% 
20cr%20scoring%200501.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BEF-HMA9]; see, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS ON CONSUMERS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 51–56 
(2007), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/credit-based-
insurance-scores-impacts-consumers-automobile-insurance-report-congress-federal-trade/p0448 
04facta_report_credit-based_insurance_scores.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB9Q-668G] (analyzing 
the relationship between credit scores and race and income). 
 173. Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Signs S6209A/A7797A 
to Make Clear Civil Rights Laws Ban Discrimination Against Hair Styles or Textures Associated 
with Race (July 12, 2019), available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-
s6209aa7797a-make-clear-civil-rights-laws-ban-discrimination-against-hair [https://perma.cc/ZR9H-
FYXS]. 
 174. See D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got to Do 
With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1385 (2008) (describing how an employer’s prohibition of 
certain hairstyles associated with blackness can “demonstrate a prima facie case of race 
discrimination”). See generally  CAL. EDUC. CODE §  212.1 (2020) (amending the California code 
to preclude such discrimination). 
 175. Crown Act, S.B. 188 § 1(f) (Cal. 2019) (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE §  212.1). 
 176. Indeed, we are by no means arguing that GINA or the Crown Acts are futile overall. As 
a method to combat disparate treatment and intentional proxy discrimination by humans, it may 
achieve its goal. For example, although GINA was heralded as an important civil rights bill, its 
success at protecting against discrimination on the basis of genetic test results has been very 
limited. Areheart & Roberts, supra note 26, at 725, 730. Indeed, a review of case law in the first 
ten years of the law indicated no claims of employment adverse events on the basis of genetic test 
results. Id. at 730. Instead, plaintiffs to date have argued that employers discriminated on the 
basis of family history or that employers violated the privacy provisions of the law. Id. at 735–36, 
755. Thus, a predominant part of the GINA caselaw has focused on employer collection and use 
of proxy variables for genetic information, leaving the question of whether GINA was needed and 
whether genetic test results are ever being used by employers. Id. at 750–51. In this way, GINA 
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by AIs. As suggested in Part II, AIs that are deprived of direct information 
about suspect characteristics and obvious proxies for this information will 
inevitably identify other proxy variables for directly predictive data.177 Simply 
removing an additional set of obvious proxies only forces the algorithm to 
find slightly less intuitive or slightly less accurate proxies in their stead.178 This 
point is well illustrated by the fact that the contributions made by individual 
variables in AI models routinely change depending on the training data on 
which they rely.179 For example, an AI that does not have access to data on 
positive genetic test results or visits to a genetic counselor could just as easily 
rely on membership in a genetics-community social media page to proxy for 
this directly predictive information. Similarly, to the extent that race was 
directly predictive of a target variable, an AI that did not have access to 
information about race or hairstyles would inevitably tend to construct 
 
has arguably been somewhat successful at addressing proxy discrimination as it has been 
historically conceptualized—where a particular actor specifically chooses to employ a proxy for a 
trait he or she can no longer consider. 
 177. See supra Section II.C. 
 178. In recent years, state insurance regulators have occasionally acknowledged this 
substantial gap in their regulatory scheme. For instance, the newly appointed NAIC President 
recently opined, “We want to encourage innovation but can’t allow models to be proxies for 
things which could be discriminatory practices.” National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (@naic), TWITTER (Jan. 11, 2019, 8:34 AM), https://twitter.com/naic/status/ 
1083764029485731840 [https://perma.cc/V25B-P5H5]. Towards that end, the NAIC 
developed a “Big Data” working group that is in the process of developing a white paper on best 
practices for “[r]egulatory [r]eview of [p]redictive [m]odels.” See Regulatory Review of Predictive 
Models 1 (National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2019), available at https:// 
content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Predictive%20Model%20White%20Paper%20 
Exposed%208-3-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVK4-XETX]. Remarkably, though, the current white 
paper draft does not identify the unique risks of algorithmic proxy discrimination, whether or 
how state regulators should attempt to identify it, or whether it may violate state laws. Instead, it 
simply directs state regulators to consider whether any input or output data is “unfairly 
discriminatory,” a requirement that—unadorned without further comment—requires only that 
there exist an actuarial relationship between the input data and claims projections. Id. at 5. The 
lack of any coherent framework for identifying, diagnosing, or responding to proxy 
discrimination in insurance is particularly troubling because insurance markets are likely to 
aggressively exploit AI and big data to discriminate among policyholders. See Ari Libarikian, Kia 
Javanmardian, Doug McElhaney & Ani Majumder, Harnessing the Potential of Data in Insurance, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (May 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/ 
our-insights/harnessing-the-potential-of-data-in-insurance [https://perma.cc/D4F9-WHDD]; 
Dan Robinson, AI in Insurance: How Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Could Transform Sector in 
2019, NS BUS. (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.ns-businesshub.com/science/ai-in-insurance-2019 
[https://perma.cc/SW73-6Q5A]; see also Michael W. Elliott, Insights 2017 Article: Big Data 
Analytics: Changing the Calculus of Insurance, INSTS.: CPCU SOC’Y (June 23, 2017, 10:29), https:// 
infotech.ig.cpcusociety.org/news/insights-2017-article-big-data-analytics-changing-calculus-insurance 
[https://perma.cc/S2LZ-9EDY]. For these reasons, the Government Accountability Office 
recently highlighted proxy discrimination as a potential concern in the growing insuretech 
sector. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-423, INSURANCE MARKETS: BENEFITS AND 
CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY INNOVATIVE USES OF TECHNOLOGY 17 (2019). 
 179. See Gillis & Spiess, supra note 29, at 463. 
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alternative proxies, such as Netflix shows watched, or even hair products 
purchased. 
Making matters even worse, the black box nature of AIs and the vastness 
of big data mean that intuition alone will often be inadequate to identify an 
AI’s use of a proxy variable, even after the fact.180 No longer are the 
“traditional” proxies, like headgear, hairstyles, or height and weight, the only 
potential substitutes for our society’s protected traits. Instead, AIs can 
generate proxies for directly predictive suspect traits based on all sorts of 
behavior, from what movies one streams online to the language one uses in 
social media posts. Even more importantly, the proxies available to AIs may 
consist of numerous interacting pieces of data, whose significance as a proxy 
may be completely unintuitive.181 For instance, people with a pathogenic 
variant in the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes may be identifiable to an AI that 
combines geo-locational, web-surfing, and shopping patterns.182 For this 
reason it will often be impossible to determine whether an AI is proxying for 
a protected trait simply by scrutinizing the data on which it ultimately relies.183  
2. Traditional Disparate Impact Liability 
A second common strategy for combatting proxy discrimination is 
disparate impact liability.184 Of course, such liability is particularly important 
in the employment context, where Title VII bars employment practices that 
have a disparate impact based on race, color, religion, national origin, or 
sex.185 But disparate impact liability also exists in a number of other anti-
discrimination regimes, including housing and credit.186 By contrast, 
 
 180. This point is true even though, as Gillis & Spiess emphasize, the decision rule is actually 
much more transparent in the context of discrimination by AIs, as compared to discrimination 
by humans. See id. at 465. 
 181. W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 421 (2015) 
(“[M]any important relationships are not one-to-one, two-to-one, or even several-to-one 
correspondences, but are instead networks among dozens of interacting variables, including 
those which are readily observable . . . and those that are not . . . .”); see also Coglianese & Lehr, 
supra note 59, at 17 (“[C]omplex data sets necessarily contain complex inter-variable 
relationships, making it even more difficult to put into intuitive prose how a machine-learning 
algorithm makes the predictions it does.”). 
 182. SOLON BAROCAS,  ALEX ROSENBLAT, DANAH BOYD, SEETA PEÑA GANGADHARAN & 
CORRINE YU, DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS: TECHNOLOGY PRIMER 1 (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2014-1030/Technology.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ABC-N6 
T6]; Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 59, at 17; Price, supra note 181, at 42. 
 183. Glymour & Herington, supra note 79, at 275. 
 184. For a description of the basic disparate impact legal framework, see supra Part II. 
 185. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 186. See Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry’s Attack on 
Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 22–38 (2008) (discussing disparate impact theory in housing and 
“lending discrimination cases under the FHA and ECOA”). 
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disparate impact liability is not available under state insurance laws or 
GINA.187  
Disparate impact liability does indeed help combat intentional proxy 
discrimination. This should not be surprising, given that proxy discrimination 
is simply one specific type of practice that produces a disparate impact.188 To 
be sure, discriminators can defeat a disparate impact claim by showing that 
their practices are consistent with business necessity and that no less 
discriminatory alternative is available.189 But meeting these burdens will 
typically be difficult for an intentional proxy discriminator, especially since 
the plaintiff can show that any such explanation is pretextual. At least in part 
for these reasons, a number of commentators have even suggested that the 
core goal of disparate impact regimes is to help identify shrouded intentional 
discrimination, a category that includes intentional proxy discrimination.190   
By contrast, disparate impact liability (as it is currently constructed) is 
simply not capable of effectively policing against proxy discrimination by AIs. 
The central problem is that firms using AIs that proxy discriminate will 
typically have little problem showing that this practice is consistent with 
business necessity and in rebuffing any attempt to show the availability of a 
less discriminatory alternative.191 This is because, by definition, proxy 
discrimination helps the AI predict a legitimate objective: the target variable 
it is programmed to optimize, like anticipated insurance claims.192 Moreover, 
there is no obvious way for a plaintiff to advance a less discriminatory 
alternative, given that AIs are indeed uniquely effective at optimizing their 
programmed objective, notwithstanding their tendency to construct proxies 
 
 187. GINA expressly excludes a private cause of action based on disparate impact. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000ff-7(a) (2012); Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75, 
86–87 n.74 (2016) (“As of the writing of this Article, Congress has yet to establish the commission 
as mandated by GINA.”); Jennifer K. Wagner, Disparate Impacts and GINA: Congress’s Unfinished 
Business, 5 J.L. & BIOSCI. 527, 545 (2019); Schwarcz, Civil Rights, supra note 169, at 19. In 
insurance, disparate impact liability has historically potentially been available against property 
insurers under the Fair Housing Act. See Kaersvang, supra note 8, at 1997. But such liability has 
also faced a number of important hurdles, including reverse preemption under the McCarran 
Ferguson Act. 
 188. See supra Part II (describing how proxy discrimination is one particular, and unusually 
pernicious, form of disparate impact). 
 189. Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A); Girardeau A. 
Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1149 (2010). 
 190. See supra Part II. 
 191. See Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 
30 GA. L. REV. 387, 392 (1996) (describing how the Civil Rights Act of 1991 shapes the business 
necessity defense in disparate impact cases). 
 192. Kim, supra note 3, at 866 (noting that “to ask whether the model is ‘job related’ in the 
sense of ‘statistically correlated’ is tautological”); see Bornstein, supra note 7, at 553–58; see also 
Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 701–12 (discussing the potential for discrimination in 
data mining and AI). 
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for directly predictive suspect characteristics to which they do not have 
access.193 
B. POTENTIALLY EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR COMBATTING PROXY  
DISCRIMINATION BY AIS 
Although traditional approaches to combatting intentional proxy 
discrimination are inadequate to prevent proxy discrimination by AIs, the law 
is not powerless to prevent such discrimination. Below we discuss five different 
strategies that might be able to effectively combat proxy discrimination by AIs, 
depending on the context. The first two approaches are mutually exclusive as 
they relate to the amount and type of data actors can access. By contrast, the 
next three possibilities—which require algorithms to be transparent, ethical, 
or justified by plausible causal connections—condition firms’ use of AIs to 
discriminate in a manner that could be combined with one another, as well 
as coupled with one of the first two options. 
Of course, no single solution will be appropriate for all anti-
discrimination regimes. Instead, the optimal interventions will depend on 
myriad factors, such as the extent to which proxy discrimination is likely to 
strike at the heart of a particular anti-discrimination regime’s goals and the 
existing infrastructure for policing against prohibited forms of 
discrimination. Additionally, because the goal of algorithms is to ferret out 
the most efficient predictors of a programmed outcome, any regulatory 
interventions will naturally limit discriminators’ capacity to achieve their 
otherwise legitimate goals. However, algorithmic proxy discrimination can 
only exist when the law has decided to prohibit “rational” discrimination due 
to broader social concerns.194 If algorithmic proxy discrimination is left 
unchecked due to narrowly-defined notions of efficiency, then it must be 
acknowledged that this comes at the expense of these laws’ goals. 
1. Flipping the Default: Prohibiting Discrimination Based on  
Non-Approved Factors 
As suggested above, in an age of AI and big data it is impossible to identify 
ex ante all potential proxies for suspect characteristics, as GINA and other 
laws attempt to do. Proxy discrimination by AIs could thus be prevented by 
flipping the default approach of anti-discrimination law: Instead of allowing 
use of any variable not barred, as in the traditional anti-discrimination model, 
this approach would only allow actors to use pre-approved variables. It would 
thus limit algorithmic proxy discrimination by making AI almost completely 
 
 193. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 428 (“In short, the current state of disparate impact law leaves 
the legality if [sic] Arti’s operations unclear. At most, its use of explicit classifiers on prohibited 
grounds would be barred under a pure causal analysis, but its achieving much the same result by 
relying on factors correlated with but not formally race or sex may well be permitted.”); see also 
Barocas & Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 711–12; Bornstein, supra note 7, at 525. 
 194. See supra Section III.A. 
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useless relative to traditional statistical methods given the availability of so few 
variables. 
This is the model of the ACA. The ACA inverts the traditional approach 
to combating rational discrimination from piecemeal removal of concerning 
traits to full scale removal of all traits, with limited exceptions. As a result, 
health insurers subject to the ACA are only allowed to consider four traits in 
their rating schemes: the number of people insured, their geographic area, 
their age, and whether they smoke.195 The first two of these factors are not 
proxies for health because they are predictive of costs for reasons that are 
totally unrelated to health. By contrast, the latter two factors do indeed proxy 
for health, but in ways that reflect an intentional and considered policy 
judgment. By restricting insurance discrimination in rating to four pre-
approved traits with well understood relations to the underlying suspect trait 
of health status, the ACA limits insurers’ capacity to engage in proxy 
discrimination for policyholder health with AI by locating potential proxies, 
such as gym membership, eating habits, or medical debt. Indeed, the ACA 
model not only limits the potential for proxy discrimination for health,196 but 
effectively limits proxy discrimination by gender, race, and other protected 
traits given the narrow scope of available traits to consider. 
The ACA is not the only setting where this flipped default model has been 
employed. California’s Proposition 103 is another example.197 Under 
Proposition 103, auto insurers can only set premiums on the basis of an 
individual’s driving record, mileage, years of driving experience, and “other 
factors that the commissioner may adopt by regulation.”198 Each of the law’s 
pre-specified factors is predictive of risk for reasons that are orthogonal to 
legally suspect characteristics in auto insurance, like race and income. 
Similarly, Proposition 103’s final discretionary category allows regulators to 
approve potential variables as long as those characteristics “have a substantial 
relationship to the risk of loss.”199 The system allows regulators to condition 
the inclusion of new factors into rates on insurers demonstrating that those 
 
 195. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Some states restrict the allowable traits even 
further. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
Market Rating Reforms, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-
Market-Reforms/state-rating.html [https://perma.cc/E28F-N8SY]. 
 196. See, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (and Isn’t) Healthism?, 50 
GA. L. REV. 833, 845–46 (2016) (describing how the ACA limits health-status discrimination by 
insurers and “attempts to improve health insurance coverage”). 
 197. See Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Regulation of Automobile Insurance in California, in 
AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY 
INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 195, 199 (J. David 
Cummins ed., 2002). 
 198. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a) (West 2003). 
 199. Id. Over time the California Insurance Commissioner has added a variety of optional 
rating factors, such as type of vehicle, completion of a driver training course, and, even, marital 
status of the driver. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.5(d) (2019). 
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factors are predictive of risk for reasons having nothing to do with race, 
income, or other legally-suspect characteristics.200 
Although flipping the default has been utilized in a few settings, it comes 
with significant efficiency and political economy tradeoffs. For instance, by 
limiting health insurers’ capacity to leverage big data to help predict future 
claims experience, the ACA has caused some insurers’ costs to outpace 
revenues, necessitating future premium increases for the entire pool.201 At 
least partially as a result, the Trump Administration has adopted new policies 
that threaten to reopen the gates of proxy discrimination—or even 
intentional discrimination—by creating new exceptions to the ACA’s strict 
limitations on health insurance discrimination.202  
 
 200. This mechanism has also been introduced in a narrower setting within genetic testing. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, an advisory committee was established to review which 
genetic tests insurers could take into account. See Prince, supra note 26, at 642–43. 
 201. See, e.g., Tony Leys, Iowa Teen’s $1 Million-per-Month Illness No Longer a Secret, DES MOINES 
REG. (May 31, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/health/2017/ 
05/31/hemophilia-patient-costing-iowa-insurer-1-million-per-month/356179001 [https:// 
perma.cc/BFF2-QZ8G]. This cycle of rising premiums is the so-called death spiral. It results when 
the increased premiums could result in individuals at lower risk opting to leave the insurance 
pool rather than take on costs disproportionately high for their associated risk. As more low-risk 
individuals leave the pool, the proportion of claims cost rises, resulting in another round of 
premium increases. 
 202. Certain health plans are reintroducing underwriting on the basis of multiple ‘rational’ 
characteristics back into the system. For example, in 2018, the Trump administration expanded 
the availability of short duration plans. Short Term, Limited Duration Insurance, 83 Fed. Reg. 
38,212 (Aug. 3, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 
146, 148). There is ongoing litigation about the validity of these rules, but at the moment they 
remain valid. Katie Keith, ACA Litigation Round-Up: Risk Corridors, CSRs, AHPs, Short-Term Plans, 
and More, HEALTH AFF. (May 23, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hblog20190523.823958/full [https://perma.cc/9PLR-8QTS]. Short duration plans were 
originally meant to be short-term stop gap insurance available to individuals as they transitioned 
between health plans, such as during a job transition. The plans are exempt from the ACA 
underwriting and coverage requirements and can therefore offer cheaper insurance to healthy 
individuals, although without offering coverage for many important healthcare needs. KAREN 
POLLITZ,  MICHELLE LONG, ASHLEY SEMANSKEE & RABAH KAMAL, UNDERSTANDING SHORT-TERM 
LIMITED DURATION HEALTH INSURANCE 3 (2018), available at http://files.kff.org/attachment/ 
Issue-Brief-Understanding-Short-Term-Limited-Duration-Health-Insurance [https://perma.cc/H93 
C-JGM3]. In early regulation, the short-duration plans were limited to less than three months. 
Excepted Benefits; Lifetime and Annual Limits; and Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance, 
81 Fed. Reg. 75,316 (Oct. 31, 2016) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 
C.F.R. pts. 144, 146, 147, 148); Sarah Lueck, With Federal Rules Weakened, States Should Act to Protect 
Against Short-Term Health Plans, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS (Aug. 1, 
2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/with-federal-rules-weakened-states-should-act-to-
protect-against-short-term-health-plans [https://perma.cc/GH4D-3QTK]. The new Trump 
administration rules allow short duration plans to underwrite on the basis on pre-existing health 
conditions for policies that last up to 364 days, but that can be renewed for up to 36 months. 
Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance, 83 Fed. Reg. 38,212 (Aug. 3, 2018) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146, 148). While the short duration plans 
are allowed at the national level, some states are attempting to limit their scope. Lueck, supra; see 
Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance, 83 Fed. Reg. 38,212 (Aug. 3, 2018) (to be codified at 
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There has also been an industry shift to parsing risk (perhaps with the 
help of AIs) in marketing and product design, rather than rating. By so 
dramatically limiting insurer discrimination in rating, the law has arguably 
caused insurers to try to avoid high-risk customers in other ways, like 
developing a set of covered benefits that would be unattractive to those at 
higher risk or targeting marketing efforts to those at lower risk.203 These 
trends highlight the invariable cat and mouse nature of addressing proxy 
discrimination, even with relatively aggressive legal tools.  
Of course, the ACA has been a political lightening rod for a variety of 
reasons, not only due to its changes in rating. California’s Proposition 103, 
for example, has been less controversial. However, given the radical changes 
that flipping the default brings, it is simultaneously one of the most effective 
strategies at combating algorithmic proxy discrimination and one that is 
perhaps the least likely to work. 
It also has been implemented in two insurance contexts where the 
purchase of insurance is, or at least was intended to be, mandatory across a 
large risk pool. This therefore limits any impact of adverse selection. Should 
other areas, such as access to loans, housing, or employment, be similarly 
guaranteed no matter what one’s traits—or upon consideration of only a 
specific few set of characteristics? The answer to this question is likely no in 
most settings. Perhaps a few other areas could be equally appropriate for a 
 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146, 148); see also H.R. 1520, 29th Leg, 
Reg. Sess. § 431:10A (Haw. 2017); H.R. 2624, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 10, 15 (Ill. 
2019); Maryland Health Care Access Act of 2018, H.R. 1782, 438th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 
6-102.1, 15-1202, 15-1301 (Md. 2018). In addition to short-duration plans, the Trump 
Administration has also increased the breadth and availability of association plans. Definition of 
“Employer” Under Section 3(5) of ERISA—Association Health Plans, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,912 (June 
21, 2018) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). A recent district court opinion vacated these 
rules as “clearly an end-run around the ACA.” New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 363 F. Supp. 3d 
109, 117 (D. D.C. 2019). However, this opinion has been appealed by the Trump Administration 
with an expedited review in the DC Circuit pending. Keith, supra. 
 203. See, e.g., Marshall Allen, Health Insurers are Vacuuming up Details About You—And It Could 
Raise Your Rates, PROPUBLICA (July 17, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/ 
health-insurers-are-vacuuming-up-details-about-you-and-it-could-raise-your-rates [https:// 
perma.cc/6EGC-5JMC] (highlighting an insurer that used a square-dancing event as a way to 
attract healthy seniors to their pool, but also showing how cataloged data could help these 
marketing trends). The ACA anticipated these potential practices and prohibits insurers in the 
ACA marketplace from using marketing practices or benefit designs that “have the effect of 
discouraging the enrollment in such plan[s] by individuals with significant health need[].” 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1)(A) (2010), declared unconstitutional by Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 
355 (5th Cir. 2019), amended by Pub. L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat. 2534 (2019) (Supreme Court cert. 
petition pending). But these restrictions do not apply to newer forms of health risk pooling. For 
example, there are no requirements that either association plans or short duration plans cover  
a minimum floor of essential health benefits, as there is with ACA health plans. Sarah Lueck,  
3 Factors That Will Determine the Damage from Association Health Plans, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (July 27, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/3-factors-that-will-determine-
the-damage-from-association-health-plans [https://perma.cc/4UG5-3Y9Z]; see also Essential 
Health Benefits Package (“EHB”)—Benchmark Plan Standards, 45 C.F.R. § 156.110 (2015). 
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revolutionary change in access, such as higher education, but access to loans 
or other types of insurance are less likely to be viewed as social goods that 
justify such sweeping alterations of underwriting processes. 
2. Expanding the Information Used: Requiring More Data to Limit  
Certain Types of Proxy Discrimination 
Although prohibiting discrimination based on non-approved factors will 
naturally limit proxy discrimination by AIs, expanding the amount of 
information available to an AI could also decrease the occurrence of certain 
forms of proxy discrimination.204 As recognized in the substantial literature 
on “statistical discrimination,” much illegal discrimination is “rational” in the 
sense that it reflects real, statistical differences in relevant characteristics 
among different groups.205 In many such cases, the discriminator could—with 
more effort—directly assess the relevant factor, rather than relying on illicit 
traits as a proxy for these factors. For instance, employers who have legitimate 
reasons to discriminate against individuals with criminal histories may 
“rationally” resort to discriminating on the basis of race given well-known race-
based disparities in incarceration rates.206  
As discussed in Part II, scenarios in which statistical discrimination is 
rational create the possibility that an AI may engage in proxy discrimination; 
a subtype that we labelled “indirect proxy discrimination.”207 But it also 
creates the very real possibility that AIs may, in fact, decrease the incidence of 
statistical discrimination—by proxy or otherwise—by reducing the costs of 
acquiring and processing data about directly relevant characteristics.208 For 
instance, to the extent that past incarceration rates are indeed directly 
predictive of job performance for a particular employer, the AI might either 
 
 204. Cf. Strahilevitz, supra note 22, at 365–72 (suggesting that the government should 
publish more data about individuals, such as criminal history, in order to minimize racial 
discrimination). 
 205. See generally Charny & Gulati, supra note 42 (explaining that “statistical discrimination” 
occurs when the traits of a group serve as the basis of “employment decisions” instead of 
individual traits).  
 206. To appreciate this possibility, consider state efforts to pass “Ban the Box” legislation, 
which bars “employers from asking [applicants] about . . . criminal histories” in initial 
applications. See Agan & Starr, supra note 42, at 191. Although the goal of the legislation was to 
reduce barriers to employment for those with criminal convictions, the laws may have the 
unintended consequence of increasing racial disparity in hiring. See id. at 229. If an employer 
who does not want to hire anyone with a criminal record is prevented from collecting this 
information, they may instead turn to “statistical discrimination” strategies whereby they assume 
that black applicants are more likely to have a criminal record and therefore hire fewer blacks as 
compared to whites. Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt  
Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories Are  
Hidden 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22469, 2016). 
 207. See supra Section II.C. 
 208. See supra Section II.C. 
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be able to directly access this information or else to construct more reliable 
proxies than race for this information.   
It follows that increasing AI’s access to relevant data could decrease the 
program’s need to rely on proxies for suspect characteristics by allowing it to 
more directly measure the factors that most directly relate to risk.209 Adding 
data to AI models would also minimize situations where actors implicitly 
accept the possibility of decreased accuracy in their models to save costs on 
collecting or verifying information.210  
At the same time, increasing the availability of data to AIs comes with 
many possible costs. First, while this strategy could decrease indirect proxy 
discrimination, it could also have the opposite effect. For example, providing 
more data to an AI that previously used race to proxy for a history of 
incarceration could cause it to derive a proxy for incarceration that omitted 
race, but it could also cause it to better target race so as to predict 
incarceration history. Second, and for similar reasons, increasing the AI’s 
access to data would almost certainly increase the incidence of opaque and 
causal proxy discrimination, at least to the extent that legally suspect variables 
were directly predictive. Finally, increasing the availability of data comes at 
the expense of individual privacy. In the era of big data, employers, insurers, 
and lenders might have to access copious amounts of social, medical, and 
personal data, some mundane and some sensitive, about individuals to truly 
minimize indirect proxy discrimination. It is not clear that this is a trade-off 
worth making.  
3. Transparency-Oriented Reforms 
While the previous two solutions focused on the amount of data available 
to an algorithm, other possible solutions focus instead on how algorithms can 
or should employ that data. One such potential solution is to require 
discriminators to disclose information about how their algorithms impact 
members of protected groups.211  
 
 209. See Strahilevitz, supra note 22, at 368 (explaining that employers currently use proxies 
such as “spotty work history and being unemployed for more than a year” when the employer 
does not conduct a criminal background check). Although this will make it more difficult for 
some to access social goods. For example, although allowing employers to access information 
about criminal convictions will lower racial disparities in hiring, it will obviously not address 
legitimate public concerns about access to employment for those with a past conviction. 
 210. See Prince, supra note 26, at 651–52 (highlighting that insurers may be willing to trade 
some inefficiencies in modeling to save costs on data collection and verifying); see also Barocas & 
Selbst, Big Data, supra note 5, at 689–90 (discussing the costs of adding more data to algorithms 
and the resultant acceptance of less accurate models). 
 211. Hoffman, supra note 102, at 85. The European General Data Protection Regulation 
(“GDPR”) also implemented requirements to provide information about and explain automated 
decision-making. Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris Russell, Counterfactual Explanations Without 
Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 841, 861 (2018).  
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Of course, this transparency-oriented approach would only allow third-
parties to identify generalized disparate impact, rather than the more specific 
problem of proxy discrimination.212 At the same time, robust disclosure 
regarding the impact of discrimination by AIs could help third-party 
researchers, litigants, and government entities to identify the subset of AIs 
that are most likely to be proxy discriminating. This is for two reasons. First, 
proxy discrimination necessarily produces a disparate impact, even if not all 
practices producing a disparate impact amount to proxy discrimination.213 
Disclosure of an AI’s impact on protected groups can thus help third-parties 
isolate potential instances of proxy discrimination. Second, proxy 
discrimination will generally produce a distinctive type of disparate impact: 
The greater the statistical link between a legally protected characteristic and 
a facially neutral objective, the greater the magnitude of any disparate impact 
resulting from proxy discrimination.214  This pattern should once again help 
provide red flags of proxy discrimination. 
Consider an illustration of how those armed with appropriate data might 
be able to identify potential proxy discrimination. Suppose two similar large 
employers rely on AI and big data to guide their interviewing and hiring 
decisions. One of those employers offers robust employer-sponsored health 
insurance, while the other directs its employees to purchase coverage on the 
individual market, perhaps with the support of employer-funding through a 
Health Reimbursement Account.215 Data showing that the first employer, 
which offered full health insurance to employees, also happened to hire 
substantially fewer individuals who had previously undergone genetic testing, 
would be highly suggestive that its AI was engaging in proxy discrimination. 
Not only would it show that the AI disparately impacted those likely to have a 
genetic condition, but it would do so in a context where there is likely to be a 
strong link between a legally protected characteristic (genetic information) 
and a facially neutral objective (reducing the costs of employer-sponsored 
health insurance). 
Standing alone, this solution would merely increase the likelihood that 
firms using AIs to proxy discriminate could be publicly identified. Whether 
that result would help limit the prevalence of proxy discrimination would 
depend on a variety of factors, including the prospect that such information 
 
 212. See id. at 843–44 (proposing that actors provide counterfactuals to explain how their 
algorithm made a decision). 
 213. See supra Part II. 
 214. See supra Part II. 
 215. See Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by 
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 130 (2011). The Trump Administration recently 
released rules allowing employers to contribute pre-tax dollars to Health Reimbursement 
Accounts, which could then be used by employees to purchase coverage in the individual 
marketplace. See generally Health Reimbursement Arrangements and Other Account-Based 
Group Health Plans, 83 Fed. Reg. 54,420 (proposed Oct. 29, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pts. 144, 146, 147, 155). 
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could trigger negative media attention, new regulatory scrutiny, or novel legal 
theories. In all likelihood, however, this type of transparency reform would 
need to be paired with one of the more aggressive interventions described in 
subsequent Sections in order to meaningfully prevent proxy discrimination.   
Moreover, there are a variety of different concerns and design issues that 
would come along with the collection and release of data regarding how 
protected groups fare when they interact with firms that deploy predictive 
analytics.216 For instance, should the data be made available only to regulators, 
or also to the public? In either event, can the data be anonymized to reduce 
the likelihood that impacted individuals can be identified, particularly when 
their underlying membership in a protected group is potentially private 
information, as in the case of genetic information? Finally, what would be the 
challenges and costs of implementing this type of disclosure regime? 
Providing an explanation of algorithms can be complex and may run into 
other legal frameworks of trade secrets and privacy laws.217 
These challenges are not, however, insurmountable, as demonstrated by 
the existence of exactly this type of disclosure regime in the home mortgage 
context. In particular, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) 
requires most lenders to report and make publicly available geocoded 
information regarding home loans, loan applications, interest rates, and the 
race, gender, and income of loan applicants.218 This disclosure regime has 
promoted a massive amount of academic research and helped to identify both 
lending practices that disparately impact protected groups as well as 
intentional proxy discrimination in the form of redlining.219  
4. Ethical Algorithms that Explicitly Control for Proxy Discrimination 
While it is not possible to ex ante identify all potential proxies an AI may 
use,220 it is possible to verify that specific characteristics are not proxies for 
suspect characteristics: Doing so simply requires showing that a characteristic 
 
 216. See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. 
Reidenberg, David G. Robsinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638–
39 (2017) (highlighting various reasons why transparency-related reforms will not be successful). 
 217. Wachter, Mittelstadt & Russell, supra note 211, at 881–83. 
 218. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (2012); 12 C.F.R. §§ 203.4–
203.5 (2018).  
 219. See, e.g., DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, WEI LI, CAROLINA REID & ROBERTO G. QUERCIA, 
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOST GROUND, 2011: DISPARITIES IN MORTGAGE LENDING AND 
FORECLOSURES 31 (2011), available at https://communitycapital.unc.edu/files/2011/11/Lost-
Ground-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/PLS2-H9KT] (finding “that low-income and minority 
borrowers and neighborhoods have been disproportionately impacted by foreclosures and that 
this reflects the higher incidence of higher-risk products received by these groups”); Jacob S. 
Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 
629, 644–46 (2010) (finding a higher number and rate of foreclosures in metropolitan areas 
where there is a large “degree of Hispanic and especially black segregation”).  
 220. For further discussion, see supra Section IV.B.1. 
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remains similarly predictive of outcomes even when controlling for 
membership in a suspect group. Proxy discrimination can therefore be 
eliminated from statistical models—whether or not those models are 
produced by AIs—through a conceptually straightforward statistical 
process.221 The specifics of this process, as well as a range of more technical 
details, are described extensively in an important, though little appreciated, 
economics paper published in 2011.222 
Counterintuitively, the first step in this process is for the statistical model 
under consideration to be re-estimated in a way that explicitly includes data 
on legally prohibited characteristics. For a model produced by an AI, 
accomplishing this requires including in the training data information on 
legally prohibited characteristics, such as the race or health status of 
individuals in the training population. This first step is necessary because it 
removes any predictive power that derives from legally permitted variables’ 
capacity to proxy for a prohibited characteristic. In a model that explicitly 
includes all suspect variables, non-suspect variables will be treated as 
predictive only to the extent that they are predictive for reasons having 
nothing to do with their correlation to prohibited characteristics.  
Having stripped from all permitted variables any predictive power 
attributable to proxy effects, the next step in the statistical process is to remove 
from the model any individualized information about legally prohibited 
characteristics. This step ensures that the ultimate model does not 
discriminate based on legally prohibited characteristic. Unfortunately, 
however, simply stripping the prohibited characteristic from the model can 
undermine the remainder of the model. Instead, therefore, it is generally 
necessary for the ultimate model to include consideration of the prohibited 
characteristic, but for it to assign the population average of that variable to 
every person subject to the model.223 
 
 221. See Pope & Sydnor, supra note 9, at 206–09. For practical proposals to implement ethical 
algorithms in insurance, see Birny Birnbaum, Presentation at CAS Ratemaking Seminar: 
Insurance Regulation: The Challenge of Big Data in Insurance (2018) (on file with Author). 
 222. According to Google Scholar, the Pope and Sydnor paper has been cited only 23 times 
since publication in 2011. Only two of those citations were from law reviews, and only one of 
them from a law review that was not co-authored by one of the co-authors of this paper. The 
paper’s technique was recently modeled in the context of food safety and eating establishments. 
See generally Kristen M. Altenburger & Daniel E. Ho, When Algorithms Import Private Bias Into Public 
Enforcement: The Promise and Limitations of Statistical Debiasing Solutions, 175 J. INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORETICAL ECON. 98 (2018) (discussing the limitations of the Pope & Sydnor applicability). 
Altenburger and Ho caution against using this technique in all settings; however, they specifically 
note that the technical solution may be inapt when attempting to address disparate impacts due 
to bias. This is different than the problems outlined in this paper where the protected trait is 
statistically linked to the desired outcome. 
 223. The process is actually more complicated for non OLS models, a matter which is 
addressed extensively in the Pope and Sydnor paper. The basic intuition, however, is the same 
across all types of statistical models: to ensure that “only the coefficients from the non-sensitive 
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Although this procedure for eliminating proxy discrimination in 
statistical models is reasonably straight-forward conceptually, it is also 
admittedly fraught with practical difficulties. In particular, not only does this 
approach require firms to collect data about legally prohibited characteristics, 
but it also requires them to attempt to measure the actual predictive power of 
these characteristics. It is easy to imagine how this process could 
unintentionally increase intentional discrimination; if a discriminator learned 
that a legally suspect characteristic was highly predictive, then it might be 
more inclined to intentionally discriminate on this basis. Moreover, this 
process may ironically have the effect of creating some of the very expressive 
harms that are generally absent from proxy discrimination; whereas proxy 
discrimination stealthily targets members of protected groups, the statistical 
process described above explicitly measures protected groups in a way that 
could conceivably produce some dignitary and communicative harms.224  
Nor is it entirely clear that this statistical process would be legally 
permissible. In a very real sense, the process explicitly discriminates with 
respect to membership in a legally protected group in order to prevent the 
effects of such discrimination from being felt by these individuals. If this 
process were, for instance, legally mandated in an effort to prevent proxy 
discrimination, one could easily imagine a constitutional challenge suggesting 
that the government was forcing private actors to discriminate on the basis of 
sensitive characteristics.225 
Even apart from these practical and legal difficulties, the costs associated 
with mandating the statistical maneuvers described above could potentially be 
substantial. Although the statistical approach is not complicated conceptually, 
it could well become immensely complicated as a practical matter, especially 
for the types of statistical models that AIs typically concoct. Nor is it clear that 
government regulators would have the technical expertise to ensure that this 
process was correctly performed and not manipulated for illicit ends. 
Despite these very real concerns, using statistical methods to strip 
predictive models of the power to proxy for suspect characteristics represents 
one promising approach to combatting the emerging risk of proxy 
discrimination by AIs. 
 
predictors are used when producing individuals’ predicted values.” Pope & Sydnor, supra note 9, 
at 207. 
 224. See supra Section III.B.4 (discussing how proxy discrimination does not likely produce 
the communicative harms of stereotyping, since most people do not know that they are in fact 
being stereotyped as a result of such discrimination). 
 225. Kroll et al., supra note 216, at 679–82; cf. Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for 
Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 193 (2017) (“[A] simple prohibition on the use 
of protected characteristics such as race and sex in an automated decision process is easy to 
implement, but would do little to prevent biased outcomes. In any sufficiently rich dataset, proxy 
variables likely exist that closely correlate with these characteristics, permitting implicit sorting 
on those bases.” (footnote omitted)). 
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5. Requirement of Potential Causal Connections 
Algorithms and AIs rely on correlation, not causation—the predictive 
model identifies variables that are associated with the desired outcome 
without attempting to explain why such connections exist. Indeed, this is one 
of the very reasons that proxy discrimination is a likely phenomenon. The 
model does not care that the link between the variable and the desired 
outcome is due to association with a protected class; it only seeks to find the 
link. Indeed, because a model’s goal is to find the best possible predictors 
though correlation, it will often be difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
from the model alone whether proxy discrimination is occurring.  
One possible solution is to require those employing algorithms to 
convince regulators or others of a causal connections between the variables 
utilized and the desired outcome.226 When a variable is causally linked to the 
desired outcome, it cannot be acting as a proxy for a protected trait. Consider, 
for example, the use of facial analysis by life insurers.227 The AI could rely on 
many variables appearing in photographs. For example, the model could 
charge more for coverage to applicants whose photographs show stained 
teeth, indicating that they are likely to smoke. It is also, possible, however, to 
imagine an AI that utilizes features correlated with race, such as skin color or 
hairstyle, if underlying claims data shows a difference in mortality rates 
amongst whites and blacks. Requiring life insurers to establish a potential 
causal story would help to minimize proxy discrimination within the 
predictive facial modeling. It would stretch the imagination to derive a theory 
of causality between an applicant’s hairstyle or skin color to mortality. In 
contrast, there is more plausible causality between baggy eyes and mortality 
—or at least one can describe a short series of causal links between lack of 
sleep and life expectancy that does not include race as part of the causal 
theory. The New York Department of Financial Services recently 
implemented such a causality requirement when life insurers discriminate on 
the basis of external data not collected from the policyholder.228  
 
 226. This approach to addressing the risk of proxy discrimination is also suggested by 
Grimmelmann and Westreich. Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 9, at 170 (“We believe that 
where a plaintiff has identified a disparate impact, the defendant’s burden to show a business 
necessity requires it to show not just that its model’s scores are not just correlated with job 
performance but explain it.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 227. Barbara Marquand, How Your Selfie Could Affect Your Life Insurance, USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 
2017, 10:03 AM), https://eu.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance /2017/04/25/how-
your-selfie-could-affect-your-life-insurance/100716704 [https://perma.cc/MQL2-LZL4]. 
 228. See, e.g., Letter from James Regalbuto, Deputy Superintendent–Life Insurance, New 
York State Department of Financial Services, to All Insurers Authorized to Write Life Insurance 
in New York State (Jan. 18, 2019), available at https://dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/ 
circular_letters/cl2019_01 [https://perma.cc/5GA9-KMSX] (warning that unfair discrimination 
laws can be implicated when “there is no demonstrable causal link between [a variable] and  
. . . mortality”). Like most states, New York both broadly prohibits unfairly discriminatory rates 
and specifically bars insurers from using protected traits such as race, national origin, past history 
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This solution is not without its challenges. Causality is not easy to 
identify,229 and may be even more difficult to assess within the complex 
algorithmic environment.230 For this reason, this solution to proxy 
discrimination by AI should not require definitive proof of causality, but 
rather a plausible causal story.231 Additionally, it should not be expected that 
a comprehensive theory of causality be established. Some models use upwards 
of 70,000 variables to help predict desired outcomes. Establishing and 
assessing potential causality stories for each of the variables would be 
Herculean.232 Instead, regulators might require plausible causal explanations 
for the subset of variables on which the AI most heavily relies.  
Finally, some models will produce a score without indicating what 
variables have been utilized. With the predictive facial assessment, for 
example, machine learning may simply learn which faces are ‘good’ risks and 
‘bad’ risks without indicating that hairstyle and teeth color are variables used 
in the calculations. Therefore, in some situations it may be necessary to 
implement a causality solution in conjunction with transparency 
requirements or ethical algorithm requirements. Once these tools identify the 
variables most highly-correlated with protected traits, assessment of causality 
can be narrowed to these variables. Despite the potential challenges, a 
causality requirement has the ability to limit proxy discrimination and 
increase perceptions of fairness in predictive models.233 
 
of domestic violence. N.Y. INS. LAW § 2606 (McKinney 2015). Based on concerns of how growing 
use of algorithms and predictive models would challenge or circumvent these insurance anti-
discrimination laws, the NY State Department of Financial Services launched an investigation into 
use of algorithms and external data in underwriting. The circular letter was an outcome of this 
investigation. 
 229. See, e.g., Jill Gaulding, Note, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What’s Fair?, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1681 (1995) (noting that “[c]ausality . . . is a normative conclusion”); 
see also Austin, supra note 40, at 562 (arguing that the distinction between direct cause and 
indirect association “is inexact, if not entirely specious”). 
 230. Indeed, in some cases the value of algorithms and machine learning is identifying 
relationships that are outside the bounds of human intuition. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra 
note 14, at 1094. 
 231. Gaulding, supra note 229, at 1681; Wortham, supra note 93, at 380 (arguing that 
variables can be fair when they “seem grounded in a causal explanation”). 
 232. Wachter, Mittelstadt & Russell, supra note 211, at 853–54 (arguing that “the best tools 
for uncovering systematic biases are likely to be based upon large-scale statistical analysis and not 
upon explanations of individual decisions” and that establishing causal models will be both 
difficult and possibly “irrelevant”). 
 233. Gaulding, supra note 229, at 1674, 1684. Gaulding establishes a “merged theory of 
fairness” that combines elements of anti-discrimination theories and what Gaulding calls, 
efficient discrimination—a concept that links to rational discrimination. Id. The merged theory 
holds that it is fair to use a variable correlated with a risk factor except if it is highly suspect and 
does not seem to be causally connected to the risk factor. Id. Additionally, using variables that 
cause, or likely cause, an outcome may be seen as more socially acceptable because these variables 
are more likely to be within the control of the individual, and causality has historically been 
“accepted [as a] basis for . . . assign[ing] . . . moral responsibility.” Austin, supra note 40, at 559. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The emerging risks posed by AIs and big data have been the subject of 
innumerable law review articles, policy papers, articles in the popular press, 
books, and research articles in subject matters ranging from Philosophy to 
Computer Science to Sociology. Yet the precise ways in which AI and big data 
fundamentally change the risk of proxy discrimination are rarely laid out 
clearly in this vast literature, and quite frequently affirmatively misunderstood 
or totally ignored. This Article has demonstrated that AI and big data are 
game-changers when it comes to the risk of proxy discrimination, which—left 
unchecked—poses the prospect of undermining the core goals of all anti-
discrimination regimes that seek to prohibit “rational” forms of statistical 
discrimination. 
But the risk of proxy discrimination by AIs need not be left unchecked.  
To the contrary, policymakers have at their disposal a range of options for 
combatting these risks. While the most aggressive of these options would 
indeed substantially undermine the potential benefits of AI and big data, 
numerous less aggressive options are available that can allow for an 
appropriate balancing of the costs and benefits of emerging technologies.  
Rather than simply ignoring the accelerating threat of proxy discrimination 
by AIs, policymakers should confront this threat head-on in a way that reflects 
an informed and sober discussion of how to safeguard the advances made by 
existing anti-discrimination regimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
